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Humanizing Intellectual Property:
Moving Beyond the Natural Rights
Property Focus
J. Janewa Osei-Tutu*

ABSTRACT

This Article compares the natural rights property framework
with the international human rights framework for intellectual
property. These two frameworks share a common theoretical basis in
the natural rights tradition but appear to lead to conflicting outcomes.
Proponents of natural rights to intellectual property tend to support
more expansive intellectual property protections. Yet, advocates of a
human rights approach to intellectual property contend that human
rights will have a moderating influence on intellectual property law.
This Article is among the first scholarly works to explore the apparent
conflict between these two important frameworks for intellectual
property. It concludes that a human rights approach to intellectual
property enriches the natural rights intellectual property dialogue by
broadening the analysis to acknowledge and value human interests
that go beyond the individual property interest.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In this global economy, policy makers and courts regularly
confront critical questions at the intersection of intellectual property

(IP) and human rights.

For instance, should society prioritize

intangible rights in genetically modified food, cancer genes, or human
organs that have been created using 3D printing technology? How
important is it to ensure access to the genetically modified food or to
What should nations consider in
the manufactured organs?
determining whether to expand concepts of IP law to include relatively
new areas, such as indigenous knowledge and culture or rights in
public or well-known personalities?' These questions require policy

1.
For a discussion of efforts by disadvantaged groups to protect their cultural interests
through the use of IP, see Madhavi Sunder, IP, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257, 271 (2006). See also
Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, TRIPs and Traditional Knowledge: Local Communities, Local
Knowledge, and Global Intellectual Property Frameworks, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 155,
169-70 (2006).
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makers and analysts to regularly revisit questions about what IP laws
should protect, what should be excluded, and, importantly, how to
balance competing interests. 2 The answers to these questions will be
determined, in part, by the characterization of the IP rights at issue.
Utilitarian theories, which posit that innovation will take place
because patent and copyright laws incentivize people to create, are
typically used to justify IP rights. 3 According to the utilitarian
approach to IP, the public should obtain some benefit in exchange for
protecting the interests of the creator.4 Critics of high IP standards
and expansive IP rights contend that excessive IP protection
interferes with key human rights, such as the right to health or the
right to education.5
As these criticisms of the global IP regime have gained
traction, one of the increasingly common responses to its perceived
failings is to propose the adoption of a human rights framework for
IP.6 This human rights framing is not based on the classic economic
approach to the utilitarian analysis of IP.7 It is instead rooted in the

natural rights tradition.8
2.
See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, T 22,
WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration]; Chidi
Oguamanam,

Beyond

Theories: Intellectual Property Dynamics in the Global Knowledge

Economy, 9 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 104, 153 (2006); Kal Raustiala & Christopher
Sprigman, The Piracy Parodox Revisited, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1201-03 (2009) (discussing
fashion as an area of IP "negative space" where creativity flourishes); Susan K. Sell, TRIPS Was
Never Enough: Vertical Forum Shifting, FTAs, ACTA, and TPP, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 447,
448-49 (2011); Peter K. Yu, TRIPs and Its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 369, 370
(2006); discussion infra Part V.
3.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 432 (1984) ("The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an
'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate
artistic creativity for the general public good.").
4.
Sony, 464 U.S. at 432 ("The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair
return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate
artistic creativity for the general public good."); Shubha Ghosh, Patentsand the Regulatory State:
Rethinking the Patent BargainMetaphorAfter Eldred, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1315, 1316 (2004)
("Patents are commonly understood as a hypothetical contract between the inventor and the
government resulting in a quid pro quo of innovation for exclusivity.").
5.

See Peter K. Yu,

Currents and Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual

&

PropertyRegime, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323, 324-25 (2004).
6.
See Andrew T.F. Lang, Re-Thinking Trade and Human Rights, 15 TUL. J. INT'L
COMP. L. 335, 396-97 (2007) (describing the use of a human rights framework in the context of
trade and patent law).
7.
See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Patenting Transgenic Human Embryos: A Nonuse Cost
Perspective, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1597, 1658 (1993) (arguing that patents are a "utilitarian legal
construct with an economic purpose").

8.
See John T. Cross, Justifying Property Rights in Native American Traditional
Knowledge, 15 TEx. WESLEYAN L. REV. 257, 266 (2009). But see Peter K. Yu, Ten Common
Questions About Intellectual Property and Human Rights, 23 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 709, 716 (2007)
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Interestingly, advocates of a human rights approach seek
results that are often incongruous with the outcomes suggested by
many proponents of a natural rights property analysis of IP.9 Scholars
who advance a human rights framework for IP suggest that it will
result in a more balanced IP system, which may restrict IP rights
when these rights conflict with other human interests. 10 Proponents
of this framework view it as a tool for achieving a regime that gives
greater weight to human concerns, such as access to health, education,
and food. In contrast, advocates of property-based natural rights
frameworks for IP adopt these theories to promote and prioritize the
interests of the individual creator. Scholars who consider IP rights
natural entitlements often espouse the view that natural rights justify
more expansive IP protection for innovators and creators."
This Article connects these two distinct frameworks for IP
rights. It compares the US property-based natural rights framework
for IP with the international human rights framework for IP to
ascertain why these two approaches lead to opposing conclusions
about IP law. Despite their seemingly conflicting trajectories, both the
human rights approach and the natural rights property model for IP
have the same theoretical foundations. 12 Human rights are generally
understood as natural rights as described by philosophers such as
John Locke and Immanuel Kant. 13 IP theorists also draw heavily on

(stating that some scholars support an international human rights framework through a theory
based on positive law, rather than natural law).

See infra Parts 1I and IV. It is not the aim of this Article to engage the question of
9.
whether IP rights should be treated as natural rights or whether they should be justified based
on utilitarian theories. Nor does this Article purport to engage in a broader and long-standing
debate between positivism and natural law. Rather, the focus here is on the apparent tension
between natural rights property analyses of IP (predominantly in the United States) and
international human rights approaches to IP.
10.
Laurence R. Helfer, Toward a Human Rights Framework for Intellectual Property,
40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 971, 1018 (2007); see also Yu, supra note 8, at 711 (analyzing intellectual
property in the context of human rights).
11.
See Adam D. Moore, A Lockean Theory of Intellectual Property, 21 HAMLINE L. REV.
65, 66 (1997); Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents?
Reevaluating the Patent "Privilege"in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953, 1012 (2007).
But see Alina Ng, The Social Contract and Authorship: Allocating Entitlements in the Copyright
System, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 413, 461 (2009) ("An author who creates a

work and attaches no value to it loses property rights in the work by virtue of Locke's waste
prohibition."). See generally ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2011)

(analyzing the moral justifications for intellectual property rights).
Oguamanam, supra note 2, at 109 ("On the surface, the appeal to natural rights
12.
highlights the human rights nexus of intellectual property.").
13.
See MERGES, supra note 11, at 304-09 (discussing his movement away from a
utilitarian approach of IP, relying instead on theorists such as Locke and Kant); JAMES NICKEL
& DAVID A. REIDY, PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 9-10 (2011) (discussing
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modern human rights law and natural rights IP theory, natural rights
are described as those God-given rights that each human being enjoys
by virtue of being human. 15 For example, in her natural rights
property analysis of IP, Wendy Gordon acknowledges God-given
duties 16 and refers to rights people enjoy by virtue of their humanity.1 7
Although they have common origins, these natural rights
theories for IP diverge because, as this Article explains, the
predominant natural rights framework for IP in the United States is a
property-centric model, whereas the international human rights model
is not. Human rights framing can be distinguished from mainstream
natural rights property theories for IP because it recognizes all human
rights without elevating the property interest above other interests.
In this way, it bolsters the views espoused by scholars who suggest
that natural rights framing limits excessive IP rights.1 8
International human rights can, therefore, enrich the natural
rights IP discourse-and help to promote the public interest-in at
least two ways. First, the rights of the individual must be considered

Kant's view that recognition and respect of another's moral personality "sometimes manifests or
is expressed in the form of human rights").
14.
Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism
in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1540-53 (1993) (discussing a
Lockean approach to IP); Adam Mossoff, Is Copyright Property?, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 29, 36
(2005) (describing the historical references to Lockean theory in copyright law); Seana Valentine
Shiffrin, Intellectual Property, in 1 A COMPANION TO CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 653,

.

656-57 (Robert E. Goodin et al. eds., 2d ed. 2007). See generally MERGES, supra note 11.
15.
The Author acknowledges that some commentators take a positivist approach to
human rights based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and other international instruments. Nonetheless, human
rights are widely accepted as natural rights. For the purposes of this Article, human rights will
be discussed as natural rights, rather than rights that emanate solely from international treaties
and national laws. See Jack Donnelly, Human Rights as NaturalRights, 4 HUM. RTS. Q. 391, 391
(1982).
16.
Gordon, supra note 14, at 1541 ("Locke tells us that in the state of nature there is no
positive law parceling out ownership or giving any particular person the right to command
anyone else. There are, however, moral duties that constrain persons' behavior toward each
other. Locke argues that these duties are imposed by God and are discernable by reason. . .
Since all humanity is equal in the state of nature, the duties we owe others are also the duties
they owe us, and the rights I have against others they have against me." (footnotes omitted)).
17.
Id. at 1543 ("[S]ome we possess by virtue of what we do, and some we possess by
virtue of our humanity. Of the humanity-based entitlements, three are most important: our
claim right to be free from harm, our claim right to have a share of others' plenty in times of our
great need, and our liberty right to use the common." (footnotes omitted)).
18.
See Gordon, supra note 14, at 1549; Shiffrin, supra note 14, at 658; Alfred C. Yen,
Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 550-51
(1990).
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in relation to the rights of other members of society.1 9 In other words,
rights do not exist in a vacuum but are exercised within a community.
Human rights theories require an analysis of IP rights in relation to
Second, human rights framing
other equally valid rights.
de-emphasizes the property interest. Natural rights IP advocates
place the property interest at the center of the analysis. 20 In addition,
scholarly analyses of IP rights, whether based on utilitarian or
natural rights theories, tend to be conversations about property.
Human rights theory expands the scope of the discussion, and thereby
alters the nature of the analysis.
Commentators disagree about which theories should guide the
crafting of IP laws. 21 Yet these important theoretical inquiries help
shape the answers to challenging issues. As one scholar notes, the
policy debate about the appropriate level of IP protection is "neither
political nor legal, but 'conceptual."' 22 The question is whether, like
utilitarian theories, natural rights theories can adequately account for
the public interest. Human rights framing that aims to bring greater
balance to the IP regime must, therefore, be distinguished from
expansionist natural rights theories for IP.
Part II of this Article discusses the expansion of global IP
rights and the tension between public and private interests. Part III
explains why a human rights approach is a natural rights framework
Part IV of this
and identifies relevant international agreements.
Article provides an overview of classic intellectual property theories.
Part V then identifies and analyzes why the human rights model for
IP and the natural rights property model for IP, both of which are
derived from the natural rights tradition, support contradictory
conclusions about IP rights. Finally, Part VI explains how a human
rights model enriches the natural rights discussion of IP by

G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 29 (Dec. 10, 1948)
19.
[hereinafter UDHR].
20.
MERGES, supra note 11, at 31-33; Gordon, supra note 14, at 1540-44; Mossoff, supra
note 14, at 40-42.
21.
Oguamanam, supra note 2, at 106 ("The search for a unified theory of intellectual
property is an ongoing, albeit elusive adventure. The inconclusive nature of the theoretical
inquiry, coupled with the ever expanding and ubiquitous character of intellectual property,
contributes to the inherently controversial nature of the concept of intellectual property."
(footnotes omitted)). See generally JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS

OF THE MIND (2008) (discussing multiple theories of property law); MERGES, supra note 11
(same); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988)
(discussing multiple ways to conceptualize intellectual property); Mark A. Lemley, Faith-Based
Intellectual Property, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1328 (2015) (contending that traditional intellectual
property justifications are contradicted by empirical evidence).
22.
Mossoff, supra note 14, at 32 ("The fundamental issue in the policy debate is neither
political nor legal, but 'conceptual."' (footnotes omitted)).
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underscoring the fact that all rights intersect and must be recognized
as inherently valuable. As such, the human rights framework is an IP
model that does not necessarily bolster claims for natural entitlements
to property, but instead has the potential to promote human
flourishing.
II. THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
The World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS
Agreement) establishes what must be protected and what can be
excluded from IP protection in all WTO member states. 23
International IP agreements, such as the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Berne Convention) 24 and
the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (Paris
Convention), 25 long predated the TRIPS Agreement. However, nations
had significant latitude under those earlier agreements to implement
their IP obligations to suit their domestic situations. 26 This changed
under the WTO as a result of harmonized minimum standards for IP
rights, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, and the possibility of
trade sanctions for noncompliance. 2 7
A. Balancing Competing Interests
Harmonized IP standards can be useful to the extent that IP
rights serve their intended purpose. For instance, patents are thought
to stimulate innovation. 28 Copyright promotes cultural works and the
dissemination of knowledge by protecting literary and artistic works
such as songs, films, video games, and books for leisure as well as
23.
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, 1869 U.N.T.S.
299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
24.
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 99-27 [hereinafter Berne Convention].
25.
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T.
1583 [hereinafter Paris Convention]
26.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 23, art. 1(1) ("Members shall be free to determine the
appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal
system and practice.").
27.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 23, arts. 63-64; Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU].
28.
See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974) ("When a patent is
granted . . . the Federal Government is willing to pay the high price of 17 years of exclusive use
for its disclosure, which . . . will stimulate ideas and the eventual development of further
significant advances in the art.").
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Trademarks are indicators of source that allow
education. 29
consumers to make decisions efficiently in the marketplace. 30
But IP rights can also have deleterious social effects. For
instance, genetically modified crops may be protected by patent rights
that prevent farmers who purchase seeds from harvesting and
replanting the seeds. 31 Songs, novels, and films are protected by
copyright, which can limit one's ability to reproduce or share music
from one's iTunes library. 32 Trademarks help identify favorite brands
of soap, shoes, or cars, but they can also enable Christian Louboutin to
corner the market on red-soled shoes and price them such that they
are prohibitively expensive for the majority of consumers. 33
Despite its utilitarian premise, the global IP system-which
the interests of IP creators and the consuming
balance
must
3
4
public -has increasingly favored IP owners. 35 This trend is apparent
from longer terms of protection, global harmonization of minimum

17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (listing as protectable "works of authorship": (1) literary
29.
works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any
accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8)
architectural works); id. § 103(a) ("The subject matter of copyright as specified by section 102
includes compilations and derivative works.").
Trademarks are symbols used to aide consumers in selecting what they want.
30.
Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942)
("A trade-mark is a merchandising short-cut which induces a purchaser to select what he wants,
or what he has been led to believe he wants. . . . If another poaches upon the commercial
magnetism of the symbol he has created, the owner can obtain legal redress."); see also Two
Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992) ("A trademark is . . . 'any word, name,
symbol, or device or any combination thereof' used by any person 'to identify and distinguish his
or her goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to
indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown."').
See Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 569 U.S. 278, 284-85 (2013).
31.
32.
See Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 648 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(finding that reselling iTunes media files infringes on the producer's copyright).
33.
See Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holdings, Inc., 696 F.3d
206, 225-26 (2d Cir. 2012).
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 23, art. 7 ("The protection and enforcement of
34.
intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to
the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of
technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a
balance of rights and obligations."); see also Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 136 S. Ct.
1979, 1986 (2016) (noting that the Copyright Act aims to enrich the general public "by striking a
balance between two subsidiary aims: encouraging and rewarding authors' creations while also
enabling others to build on that work").
35.
Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEX. L. REV.
873, 900 (1997) (book review) ("[E]ven within the realm of existing intellectual property rights,
the power the intellectual property owner has over those rights is increasing. Copying is less
likely to be excused as a fair use of the copyright than ever before, particularly if the licensor can
show that some money could have been squeezed out of the user.").
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standards of protection, increased protections through bilateral and
multilateral international agreements, and the corresponding
response by the
access-to-medicine
and
access-to-education
movements. 36 Increasingly, the utilitarian rationales for IP laws have
been called into question. 37 Nonetheless, the trend towards increased
IP protection has continued. This is because trademarks, copyrights,
and patents-collectively referred to as IP rights-have tremendous
financial value, especially for large multinational corporations. 38
The breadth and scope of IP protection has increased over the
past several years, as has the protected subject matter under
international agreements and domestic laws. 3 9
Copyright, for
example, evolved from a fourteen-year term of protection to the life of
the author plus seventy years. 40 Courts have concluded that higher
36.
See discussion infra Part II. See generally TRIPS Agreement, supra note 23, arts.
9-40 (harmonizing minimum global standards for IP); Cynthia M. Ho, Sovereignty Under Siege:
Corporate Challenges to Domestic Intellectual Property Decisions, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 213
(2015) (lamenting that the TRIPS Agreement exposes sovereign nations to litigation by foreign
investors in response to domestic regulation of public health); Sell, supranote 2 (remarking that,
despite the TRIPS Agreement's establishment of minimum IP standards, nations have
aggressively sought increased international standards through bilateral and multilateral
agreements).
37.
Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best
Incentive System?, 2 INNOVATION POL'Y & ECON. 51, 51 (2002).
38.
Irene Kosturakis, Intellectual Property 101, 46 TEX. J. Bus. L. 37, 40-41 (2014)
(describing the financial value of intellectual property rights); see, e.g., PATENT TECH.
MONITORING TEAM, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENTING BY ORGANIZATIONS (UTILITY

PATENTS) 2015, tbl.Al-1b (2016), https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/topo_15.htm
[https://perma.cclWV5E-ZTJ8] (showing that in 2015, US corporations were granted 133,434
patents and foreign corporations were granted 144,719 patents, but only 13,463 US patents were
granted to US nationals and 5,256 to foreign individuals); MICHAEL PERELMAN, STEAL THIS IDEA:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE CORPORATE CONFISCATION OF CREATIVITY 194 (ed.
2002); SUSAN K. SELL ET AL., PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 44-50 (Steve Smith et al. eds., 2003) (discussing corporate
power

over

IP

law);

Top

300

Patents

Owners,

INTELL.

PROP.

OWNERS

AsS'N,

&

[https://perma.cc/2957https://www.ipo.org/index.php/publications/top-300-patent-owners/
JCNM] (last visited Sept. 23, 2017) (showing an increase over time in patents per corporation for
top patent owning corporations, from 3,621 patents in 2006 to 8,023 in 2016). For a variety of
international IP treaties, see generally WIPO-Administered Treaties, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ [https://perma.cc/G2CD-QLA8] (last visited Sept. 23, 2017).
39.
For example, in the international context, the TRIPS Agreement is the first major
multilateral agreement to mandate protection for geographical indications (GIs). Irina Kireeva
Bernard O'Connor, Geographic Indications and the TRIPS Agreement: What Protection Is
Provided to Geographic Indications in WTO Members?, 13 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 275, 275
(2009). Articles 22-23 of the TRIPS Agreement require protection for all GIs and special
protection for wines and spirits. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 23, arts. 22-23. Domestically, in
the landmark Diamond v. Chakrabarty case, the Supreme Court expanded patent protection to
life forms. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980).
The current term of copyright protection in the United States is life of the author
40.
plus seventy years. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012). In the Copyright Act of 1790, by contrast, copyright
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life forms are patentable 4 1 and that patent rights extend to the
offspring of self-replicating plants. 4 2 The TRIPS Agreement requires
compilations of data to be protected, removing national discretion to
assess and determine whether the databases would meet the domestic
requirements for copyright protection. 43 Some US scholars have
decried this continuous expansion of IP rights as inconsistent with the
objectives of IP law. 4 4

From an international perspective, IP obligations implemented
pursuant to the various agreements have been criticized as interfering
with access to medicine and access to food, among others.45 The
access-to-medicine advocates, for example, argue that human life will
duration was only fourteen years. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (1790). It
was extended to twenty-eight years with a fourteen-year renewal in 1831 and was extended
again in 1909 to twenty-eight years with a twenty-eight-year renewal. See U.S. COPYRIGHT
OFFICE, COMPENDIUM

OF U.S.

COPYRIGHT

OFFICE PRACTICES

17 (3d ed. 2014).

Congress

authorized an overhaul of copyright law in 1976, when it extended copyright duration to the
author's life plus seventy years. Id. at 13-14.
41.
See President & Fellows of Harvard Coll. v. Lee, 589 F. App'x 982, 983 (Fed. Cir.
2014). But see Harvard Coll. v. Canada (Comm'r of Patents), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45, 46 (Can.) ("A
higher life form is not patentable because it is not a 'manufacture' or 'composition of matter'
within the meaning of [the Canada Patent Act].").
Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 569 U.S. 278, 284-85 (2013).
42.
43.
The TRIPS Agreement requires copyright protection for databases. TRIPS
Agreement, supra note 23, art. 10(2). This obligation applies even if it would have been unclear
that the criteria for copyright protection would have been met under domestic law. Id.
("Compilations of data or other material, whether in machine readable or other form, which by
reason of the selection or arrangement of their contents constitute intellectual creations shall be
protected as such. Such protection . . . shall be without prejudice to any copyright subsisting in
the data or material itself.").
44.
See Ruth Gana Okediji, Copyright and Public Welfare in Global Perspective, 7 IND. J.
GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 117, 180 (1999) ("The protection of databases is again unprecedented in U.S.
history and is, at least, in tension with prevalent theoretical justifications of the U.S. intellectual
property system."); Yen, supra note 18, at 518-19 ("Instead of maintaining a balance between the
interests of authors and society, modern courts and legislatures have used copyright to steadily
expand authors' rights."); see also Yu, supra note 5, at 400 (arguing that the WTO, coupled with
widespread globalization, has led to international law replacing domestic policy as the
predominant means of developing intellectual property laws; thus, "the control of national
governments over the adoption and implementation of domestic intellectual property laws has
been greatly reduced").
Yu, supra note 5, at 324-25 (explaining that many developing countries have found
45.
that their initial concerns about the TRIPS Agreement have been substantiated by the regime's
failure to consider their particular needs, interests, and local conditions; thus, the increased
expansion of global intellectual property protection afforded by TRIPS Agreement has
jeopardized their access to information, knowledge, and essential medicines). But see TRIPS
Agreement, supra note 23, pmbl. (recognizing "the special needs of the least-developed country
Members in respect of maximum flexibility in the domestic implementation of laws and
regulations in order to enable them to create a sound and viable technological base"); Yu, supra
note 5, at 440-41 (arguing that developing countries can shift the intellectual property regime's
imbalance by interpreting Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement to their advantage and
exercising national discretion).
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be lost if patent rights, and the corresponding ability to raise prices,
prevent medicine from being made available to those who need it
most.46

As a result of these concerns, the WTO members issued the

Doha Declaration on Trade-Related IP Rights and Public Health,
which expressly acknowledges the role of IP in promoting innovation
while clarifying that IP rights should not interfere with the right to
health. 47
Some amount of tension between the rights of the creator and
the rights of users is inherent in IP law. 4 8 Pharmaceutical companies,
for example, explain that without adequate patent protection to
recoup their costs, they simply will not be able to produce certain
medications. 49 Access-to-medicine advocates, by comparison, assert
that there is a human right to health and that patent rights should
not interfere with access to life-saving medications.
Clearly, it is essential to strike a balance between the interests
of the rights holder and the interests of the user of IP-protected goods,
as well as between the interests of the individual and the interests of
the collective.50 But how that balance should be determined remains a
complex question. This task is more challenging at the international
level than it is domestically because of the difficulty of incorporating
domestic policy considerations into international negotiations and
disputes. When over 150 nations have come together to reach an
agreement, there is relatively limited room to interpret the obligations
in light of each nation's policy objectives.5 1 International tribunals,
such as the WTO dispute resolution panels, interpret international IP
obligations based on the text of the TRIPS Agreement, along with any
relevant context. 52 They therefore tend to give minimal consideration

46.
See Ellen F.M. 't Hoen, TRIPS, PharmaceuticalPatents and Access to Essential
Medicines: Seattle, Doha and Beyond, in ECONOMICS OF AIDS AND ACCESS TO HIV/AIDS CARE IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: ISSUES AND CHALLENGES 39, 41-42 (Jean-Paul Moatti et al. eds., 2003).

47.
Doha Declaration, supranote 2, ¶ 17.
48.
See, e.g., TRIPS Agreement, supra note 23, art. 7 (identifying the need to balance the
interests of users and producers of intellectual property).
49.

MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY 212-13

(2008).

50.

Charlotte Waelde & Abbe E.L. Brown, A PracticalAnalysis of the Human Rights

Paradox in Intellectual PropertyLaw: Russian Roulette, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN

RIGHTS: A PARADOX 183, 229 (Willem Grosheide ed., 2010).
51.
There were 164 WTO member states as of July 29, 2016. Members and Observers,
WORLD

TRADE

ORG.,

https://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/whatis -e/tif -e/org6_e.htm

[https://perma.cc/T2CV-AJNL] (last visited Sept. 24, 2017). But see TRIPS Agreement, supra
note 23, art. 1(1) (stating that WTO members can "determine the appropriate method of
implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal system and practice").
52.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
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to national policy objectives. 53 This is not surprising, given the
diversity of values, interests, and approaches to IP.
B. Global Theoretical Foundationsfor IP
There is no global consensus about the theoretical foundations
for IP rights. Nor is it clear whether international institutions, such
as the WTO and the World Intellectual Property Organization, have
embraced a natural rights or utilitarian approach in their multilateral
IP agreements. However, since most nations are WTO members, and
are therefore required to comply with the WTO obligations,
interpretations of the TRIPS Agreement have the potential to shape
IP policy both domestically and internationally. 5 4
The language of the TRIPS Agreement appears to adopt a more
consequentialist stance.5 5 For example, one of the stated goals of the
TRIPS Agreement is to reduce barriers to trade. 56 The provision that
requires a balancing of interests is found in the "objectives" in Article
7 of the Agreement.5 7 This provision states that IP protection "should
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the
transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of
producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner
conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights
and obligations."5 8
This language indicates that the TRIPS
Agreement treats IP rights as having certain utilitarian goals.
At the same time, as Samuel Oddi observed, the rhetoric of
natural rights was deployed to advance high global standards for IP
protection. 59 For example, the unauthorized sale, use, or reproduction
53.
Panel Report, Canada-PatentProtection of PharmaceuticalProducts, T 7.94, WTO
Doc. WT/DS114/R (adopted Oct. 23, 2000) [hereinafter Canada-PatentProtectionPanel Report];
54.
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 23, art. 1(1); Members and Observers, supra note
51.
55.
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 23, pmbl. But see A. Samuel Oddi,
TRIPS-NaturalRights and a "PoliteForm of Economic Imperialism", 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L

L. 415, 434-35 (1996) (characterizing Articles 27 (patentable subject matter) and 33 (term of
protection) as reflecting a natural rights approach to intellectual property).
56.
TRIPS Agreement, supranote 23, art. 41(1).
57.
Id. art. 7.
Id.
58.
59.
Oddi, supra note 55, at 432 ("Whatever may be the merits or failings of the
philosophical underpinnings of a natural rights theory of intellectual property and of patents in
particular, this theory has had great rhetorical power in convincing the world community to
sacrifice country-by-country traditional instrumentalist control over intellectual property to a
more universal world standard as dictated by TRIPS. While never quite articulated as such,
natural rights theory is submitted to have played a major rhetorical role in the strategy of
industry groups dominated by multinational corporations (MNCs) to convince their governments
in developed countries to demand 'adequate' protection of intellectual property in the GATT
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of goods protected by IP is often described as "theft." 60
This
characterization enabled proponents of globalized IP standards to
effectively argue that copying, wherever it happens, is wrong. 61 In
particular, IP-dependent industries benefitted from the rhetoric of
natural rights and the implementation of globalized IP standards
under the WTO. 62

Even if one were to view the TRIPS Agreement as supporting a
natural rights IP model, the WTO model is distinct from the human
rights approach because the TRIPS Agreement purports to address
rights that are "trade related." 63 The trade-based nature of the WTO
IP obligations is not a philosophical approach as such, but it has the
effect of emphasizing the economic value of IP rights. 64 This is why
the trade lens promotes the commodification of IP.65 Since all WTO

negotiating process."). See generally STUART P. GREEN, THIRTEEN WAYS TO STEAL A BICYCLE:
THEFT LAW IN THE INFORMATION AGE 6-7 (2012).

60.
See Irina D. Manta, The Puzzle of Criminal Sanctions for Intellectual Property
Infringement, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 469, 473-74 (2011).
61.
Oddi, supra note 55, at 433 ("Copying an invention, wherever created and patented,
becomes immoral because it is an incident of a natural property rights entitlement of the
inventor (patent owner). All countries of the world must recognize this entitlement by means of
its positive law. . . . By accepting the natural rights premise, the basic philosophical tension
between patents as a privilege or as an entitlement appears to be resolved in favor of the

latter[.]").
62.
See SELL ET AL., supra note 38, at 97-99; Oddi, supra note 55, at 455 ("The big
winners under patent TRIPS would clearly be those enterprises (read multinational
corporations) in developed countries that create inventions and are heavily engaged in
international trade. Particular winners would be those entities in the pharmaceutical and

agricultural chemical industries that receive 'supernatural' property rights under patent TRIPS.
The benefits are clear: patent protection is now mandated for fields of technology that were
previously unprotected in many countries, and the duration of protection is set at twenty years
from the filing date compared to significantly shorter periods, even when that subject matter was

protected.").
63.
Scholars have also engaged in analysis about the relationship between trade and
human rights. See Lang, supra note 6, at 335-45 (discussing human rights approaches to
international trade).
64.

Rochelle Dreyfuss & Susy Frankel, From Incentive to Commodity to Asset: How

International Law Is Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property, 36 MICH. J. INT'L L. 557, 566
(2015) ("While TRIPS laid the platform for commodification, much of the current regime shifting
is reconceptualizing IP as an asset and progressively detaching it from its grounding in
incentive-based principles.").
65.
Once IP became a global trade issue through its integration into the TRIPS
Agreement, the nature of protection shifted from incentivizing innovation to commodification.
See Pamela Samuelson, Implications of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights for CulturalDimensions of National Copyright Laws, 23 J. CULTURAL ECON. 95,
96 (1999) ("[TRIPS] puts a trade 'spin' on intellectual property rules that have in the past been
guided by a host of other principles, including those related to cultural policies embodied in
national laws. This last difference from earlier agreements may, in the long run, have a profound
impact on national intellectual property laws in part because it may push national laws toward
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members must comply with their TRIPS Agreement obligations, this
emphasis on the economic value of IP rights can be expected to
influence what happens domestically as well.66

The same is true for

greater commodification of intellectual products." (footnotes omitted)); see also Dreyfuss

&

Certainly, the
treaties that protect IP rights as investments.6 7
economic value of IP is significant. However, the societal value of IP
rights goes far beyond the economic interest.
Unlike the trade model, international human rights
encompass both moral and material interests arising from one's
Trade-based IP emphasizes economic
intellectual creations.68
interests, which may correspond to material interests. The TRIPS
Agreement, however, expressly takes no stance on the moral rights
contained in the Berne Convention.6 9 It seems that, from a TRIPS
perspective, any natural rights arguments for IP would be limited to
material interests, with moral interests falling by the wayside.
Currently, IP rights, as implemented through international
agreements, tend to take priority over other interests. 70 A natural
rights framework for IP could exacerbate this trend. Like the trade
model, a property-centric theoretical framework, such as a natural
rights property model, prioritizes the IP interest. This is because it
places the property interest above all other interests. Clearly, this
framing leads to a distinct result from a model that places equal value
on numerous competing interests.
As this Author has argued elsewhere, IP rights are more easily
elevated when competing interests are relegated to the periphery.7 1
For instance, when there is a conflict between IP rights and a human
interest, such as access to food or the right to health, there is a
tendency to analyze the conflict from a perspective that positions IP

Frankel, supra note 64, at 562-63.

66.
See J. Janewa OseiTutu, Value Divergence in Global Intellectual Property Law, 87
IND. L.J. 1639, 1655-56 (2012).
See Ho, supra note 36, at 231-36.
67.
UDHR, supra note 19, art. 27(2).
68.
69.
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 23, art. 9(1) ("Members shall comply with Articles
1 through 21 of the Berne Convention (1971) and the Appendix thereto. However, Members shall
not have rights or obligations under this Agreement in respect of the rights conferred under
Article 6bis of that Convention or of the rights derived therefrom.").
See Canada-PatentProtection Panel Report, supra note 53, ¶¶ 7.81-7.82. But see
70.
Philip Morris Brand SArl v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Award of
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/
8,
2016),
N
307
(July
the
Tribunal,
ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C1000/DC9012_En.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DBP3-Y8A4]
("[T]he
Challenged Measures were a valid exercise by Uruguay of its police powers for the protection of
public health. As such, they cannot constitute an expropriation of [Philip Morris'] investment.").
71.
J. Janewa OseiTutu, Human Development as a Core Objective of Global Intellectual
Property, 105 KY. L.J. 1, 7 (2016).
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rights at the center of the analysis. Human rights, such as the right
to food or the right to health, must then be justified as exceptions to
the IP interest. 72 The ability to give competing human interests at
least the same importance as property interests is one of the main
contributions of the human rights approach to IP.
The TRIPS Agreement does not refer to international human
rights. 73 Indeed, the human rights framework presents an attractive
alternative to the commodification of IP rights that the trade model
represents.
Importantly, human rights framing includes the
possibility of recognizing IP protection as a human right, as well as
using human rights to limit IP rights.7 4 The question is whether
characterizing a right to IP protection as a human right would support
natural rights expansionist arguments for patents and copyrights.7 5
Further, it is not clear whether IP rights, framed as human rights,
would be limited to human persons.7 6
The human rights framework is, arguably, a natural rights
approach to patent and copyright protection.7 7 Yet many access
advocates prefer a utilitarian approach over a natural rights approach
to IP.78 This may be because natural rights doctrine lends itself to
arguments that encourage greater rights for producers and reduced
access for users.79 The advantage of the utilitarian approach to IP is

72.
See OseiTutu, supra note 71, at 3-6 (arguing that other interests like human rights
do not have to be in a secondary position to IP rights).
73.
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 23, arts. 7-8.
See Helfer, supra note 10, at 1018.
74.
75.
See Kal Raustiala, Commentary, Density and Conflict in InternationalIntellectual
Property Law, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1021, 1030-31 (2007).
76.
See Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, 2007-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 41, 63 (2007); J. Janewa
OseiTutu, Corporate "Human Rights" to Intellectual Property Protection?, 55 SANTA CLARA L.

REV. 1, 2-4 (2015).
77.
See Donnelly, supra note 15, at 391; Mossoff, supra note 14, at 42.
78.
See BOYLE, supra note 21, at 27-35; LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE
FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 249-50 (2001) ("Our aim should be a system of

sufficient control to give artists enough incentive to produce, while leaving free as much as we
can for others to build upon and create. . . . [W]hile control is needed, and perfectly justifiable,
our bias should be clear up front: Monopolies are not justified by theory; they should be
permitted only when justified by facts. . . . Before the monopoly should be permitted, there
should be reason to believe it will do some good-for society, and not just for monopoly holders.");
Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1597-99
(2003) (discussing the dominant position that utilitarianism occupies in the realm of IP rights).
See Hughes, supra note 21, at 363-64 ("The preservation of cultural works has
79.
become increasingly important to all modern societies, but what counts as effective preservation
varies with the cultural object. It is not enough to preserve music scores in a library basement if
no one plays them or no one knows the tempo at which they should be played."); Mossoff, supra
note 14, at 37.
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that it requires a consideration of the law in light of its purpose.8 0 By
comparison, natural rights IP advocates would have the law focus
primarily on the interests of individual creators rather than on the
societal consequences of the law.81 This has implications for the
protection and enforcement of IP.
The human rights framework which, as noted, engenders a
balanced analysis of all rights could-perversely-be deployed to
support a natural rights expansionist approach to patent and
copyright protection.

III. HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACHES TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Some scholars have argued that IP protection is a human
right, or that aspects of IP protection are human rights. 82 Advocates
of human rights approaches to IP promote human rights philosophies
as a way to achieve a more balanced IP system. 83 For example, Megan
Carpenter suggests "a human rights perspective on IP should ...
expose the flaws of a system designed primarily to protect corporate
84
interests, and present possibilities for a more inclusive approach."
Audrey Chapman characterizes the human rights approach as taking
"what is often an implicit balance between the rights of inventors and
creators and the interests of the wider society within intellectual
85
property paradigms and makes it far more explicit and exacting."
86
This could mean higher standards for patentability, for example.
Laurence Helfer, meanwhile, proposes that a human rights
framework for IP could be used to ensure that IP serves as a tool to
achieve human rights ends.8 7 Under this framework,
[wihere intellectual property laws help to achieve human rights outcomes,
governments should embrace it. Where it hinders those outcomes, its rules should
[b]ut the focus remains on the minimum level of human
be modified[,] ...

See Adam D. Moore, Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Social Progress: The Case
80.
Against Incentive Based Arguments, 26 HAMLINE L. REV. 601, 608-10, 608 n.35 (2003).
See Hughes, supra note 21, at 297-300.
81.
Helfer, supra note 10, at 975-76; see Audrey Chapman, A Human Rights Perspective
82.
on Intellectual Property, Scientific Progress, and Access to the Benefits of Science, WIPO 1 (1999),
http://www.wipo.intledocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo-unhchr-ip-pnl_98/wipo-unhchr-ip-pnl_98_5.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J2BZ-RESC].
See Megan M. Carpenter, Intellectual Property: A Human (Not Corporate) Right, in
83.
&

THE CHALLENGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS, PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 312, 312-13 (David Keane

Yvonne McDermott eds., 2012); Helfer, supra note 10, at 974; Peter K. Yu, The Anatomy of the
Human Rights Framework for Intellectual Property, 69 SMU L. REV. 37, 38-40 (2016).
Carpenter, supra note 83, at 313.
84.
Chapman, supra note 82, at 1.
85.
Id. at 2.
86.
Helfer, supra note 10, at 1018.
87.
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well-being that states must provide, using either appropriate intellectual property
88
rules or other means.

Engaging the nuances between human rights and the existing
IP legal framework, Peter Yu outlines a layered approach for a human
rights framework that provides the minimum essential levels of
protection for moral and material interests resulting from intellectual
creations.89 This approach acknowledges that the human rights
aspects of IP may diverge from the legal aspects of IP protection9 0 and
that states have flexibility in deciding how to provide such
protection. 91
As discussed below, there is a basis for claiming human rights
to IP, even though there is some disagreement about whether there is
a human right to copyright or patent protection, as such. A human
right to IP, to the extent this right exists, is one that human beings
enjoy simply because they are human.
A. Human Rights to Intellectual Property
There is an international human rights basis for claiming IP
protection as a human right. 92 Both the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) contain language that is
suggestive of copyright and patent protection.9 3
Furthermore,
European jurisprudence has recognized trademark and copyright
property interests as human rights under the European Convention
on Human Rights. 94
88.
Id. ("A third human rights framework for intellectual property ... first specifies the
minimum outcomes-in terms of health, poverty, education, and so forth-that human rights
law requires of states. The framework next works backwards to identify different mechanisms
available to states to achieve those outcomes. Intellectual property plays only a secondary role in
this version of the framework. Where intellectual property law helps to achieve human rights
outcomes, governments should embrace it. Where it hinders those outcomes, its rules should be
modified.... But the focus remains on the minimum level of human well-being that states must
provide, using either appropriate intellectual property rules or other means.").
89.
Yu, supra note 83, at 57.
Id. at 54-55.
90.
91.
Id. at 61.
92.
See Carpenter, supra note 83, at 314; Helfer, supra note 10, at 975-76; Yu, supra
note 83, at 38-39. But see Ruth L. Gana, The Myth of Development, the Progress of Rights:
Human Rights to Intellectual Property and Development, 18 LAW & POL'Y 315, 323 (1996) ("Mhe
central features of intellectual property in most industrialized countries ... cannot be sustained
on any human rights premise.").
93.
See G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, art. 15 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICESCRI; UDHR, supra note 19, art. 27(2).
94.
Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, 2007-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 41, 67 (2007); see also id. at 72
(Steiner & Hajiyev, JJ., concurring) ("We agreed with the majority that there has been no
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The UDHR is an important instrument because, although it is
not a binding treaty, it is largely considered customary international
law. 9 5 Its status as customary international law means that it is part
of the accepted law of nations. 96 Article 27(2) of the UDHR states:
"Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material
interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of
which he is the author." 97 Similar language is found in Article 15(1)(c)
of the ICESCR, which also provides for the protection of material and
moral interests. 98
Arguably, Article 27 of the UDHR and Article 15 of the
ICESCR acknowledge a human right to IP.99 In particular, copyright
and patents seem to intersect with the human rights enunciated both
in the UDHR and in the ICESCR. 100 Copyright protects literary and
artistic works, while patents protect new, useful, and inventive
products or processes. 101 The right to the protection of moral and
material interests resulting from any scientific production of which
one is the author is less clearly related to patents, trademarks, or
copyrights than the rights related to literary and artistic works. 102
violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, but on other grounds. In our view, Article 1 of Protocol No.
1 does apply, in general, to intellectual property. This was accepted by both the parties but there
has never been any clear statement of this principle by the Court in the past. We therefore agree
that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is applicable to intellectual property in general and to a duly
registered trade mark.").

.

See Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in
95.
National and InternationalLaw, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 287, 289 (1996).
96.
Customary international law is the uncodified but binding law that emerges from
the general practices of states. See U.N. Charter and Statute of the International Court of
Justice art. 38, T 1, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 1060 ("The Court . . . shall apply . .
international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law[.]"). For more than a
century-where no treaty exists-the United States has recognized customary international law
as the law of nations. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("International law is
part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate
jurisdiction. . . . For this purpose, where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or
legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized
nations[.]").
97.
UDHR, supra note 19, art. 27.
That provision of the ICESCR states that each Party recognizes the right of
98.
everyone: "(a) To take part in cultural life; (b) To enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its
applications; (c) To benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from
any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author." ICESCR, supra note 93,
art. 15(1)
For further discussion, see OseiTutu, supra note 76, at 18-20.
99.
Audrey R. Chapman, Approaching Intellectual Property as a Human Right:
100.
Obligations Related to ICESCR Article 15(1)(C), 35 UNESCO 4, 5-6 (2001).
101.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
Copyright protects literary and artistic works, but the relationship with patents is
102.
less obvious. See Berne Convention, supra note 24, art. 2(7); Dreyfuss & Frankel, supra note 64,
COPYRIGHT
OFF.,
Copyright
in
General,
U.S.
at
562-63.
See
generally
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This is because a scientific production may not be the same thing as a
new, useful, and non-obvious invention. However, the language of
these human rights provisions has been interpreted as overlapping
with patent protection as well. 103
The UDHR also recognizes property rights. 104 To the extent
that patents, trademarks, copyrights, and other intangible rights are
considered property, this provides an additional basis for claiming a
human right to IP.105 The natural rights property-based IP model
more closely aligns with the notion of an absolute right to property. 106
It is important to note, however, that property as a human right is not
universally accepted.107
Leaving property aside for the moment, one might reasonably
conclude that a human right to the material and moral interests that
arise from the author's literary, scientific, or artistic creation coincides
However, there are
with copyright and patent protection.10 8
differences between the existing IP regime and human rights to the
moral and material interests arising from one's creative endeavors. 109
[https://perma.cclZH3B-683E] (last visited
https://www.copyright.gov/help/faq/faq-general.html
Sept. 24, 2017) (referencing fundamental information on copyright).
103.
See U.N. ESCOR, 35th Sess. 1 10, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/17 (Jan. 12, 2006)
[hereinafter General Comment 17]; Chapman, supra note 100, at 24. However, a "scientific
production" may include any science-based product, display, or report that was made by an
"author." See General Comment 17, supra, ¶ 9.
104.
UDHR, supra note 19, art. 17.
See id. ("(1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association
105.
with others. (2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.").
106.
See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134 ("T[he] third absolute right,
inherent in every Englishman, is that of property[.]"); Mossoff, supra note 11, at 971-73.
JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 5 (1988) ("[T]here is no
107.
right-based argument to be found which provides an adequate justification for a society in which
some people have lots of property and many have next to none. The slogan that property is a
human right can be deployed only disingenuously to legitimize the massive inequality that we
find in modern capitalist countries."); Peter K. Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property
Interests in a Human Rights Framework, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1039, 1041 (2007).
Carpenter, supra note 83, at 324 ("[C]opyrights and patent rights are the means by
108.
which the Article 15 creators' rights are made manifest.").
109.
General Comment 17, supra note 103, ¶ 10. 'The right of everyone to benefit from
the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific or literary
production of which he or she is the author is a human right, which derives from the inherent
dignity and worth of all persons." Id. ¶ 1; see Farida Shaheed (Special Rapporteur in the Field of
Cultural Rights), Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: Human Rights Questions,
Including Alternative Approaches for Improving the Effective Enjoyment of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, U.N. Doc. A/70/279, ¶ 90 (Aug. 4, 2015) [hereinafter Special
Rapporteur's Cultural Rights Report] ("There is no human right to patent protection under
article 15 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. This provision
does not obligate States parties to enact any particular form of patent protection. Patents are one
policy tool among many for encouraging innovation and technological research and development.
More caution is required in assessing their positive versus negative effects depending on the

226

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 20:1:207

For instance, human rights claims may not be as expansive as patent
or copyright protections. 110 Patent law awards a patent to the first
inventor to file an application for protection of an invention that meets
that nation's particular standards for patentability.1 1 1 Human rights,
on the other hand, could mean that multiple inventors should be
entitled to obtain patent protection in the same invention if they each
arrived at the invention independently. 1 12 It may also be unnecessary
to demonstrate that an invention is novel, particularly since
international human rights may not require the "production" to be
new or to meet any particular standards. 113 Furthermore, unlike
current copyright protection, a human rights basis for copyright may
not necessarily extend to derivative works or continue beyond the life
of the author. 1 14
Despite these differences between IP law and what is reflected
in international human rights instruments, there is some basis for
claiming human rights to IP. Importantly, both modern human rights
law and IP law have been explained through natural rights theories.
B. Human Rights Are NaturalRights
Human rights are generally understood to be natural rights.1 15
They are natural rights as described by John Locke.116 These rights
are fundamental and inalienable rights enjoyed by all human beings
by virtue of being human.1 17 As such, human beings are entitled to

context and the technologies at stake. Human rights law operates as a limit to prevent the
overreaching of economic claims by patent-holders in contexts where the rights to health, food,
access to technology or other human rights would be compromised.").
Yu, supra note 83, at 42-43.
110.
111.
See, e.g., Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3, 125 Stat. 284,
285-87 (2011) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-03 (2012)).
112.
The language of the UDHR Article 27 and the ICESCR Article 15 do not suggest that
only one person should be able to obtain patent protection for an invention or that the first
person to invent should be entitled to have her moral and material interests protected, to the
exclusion of all others. See ICESCR, supra note 93, art. 15; UDHR, supra note 19, art. 27. For
instance, Article 15 of the ICESCR states that everyone is entitled to benefit from the "moral and
material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the
author." ICESCR, supra note 93, art. 15.
See ICESCR, supra note 93, art. 15; UDHR, supra note 19, art. 27.
113.
114.
See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 103, 302 (2012).
Donnelly, supra note 15, at 391 ("The term human rights is generally taken to mean
115.
what Locke and his successors meant by natural rights: namely, rights (entitlements) held
simply by virtue of being a person (human being).").
Id.
116.
117.
UDHR, supra note 19, pmbl. ("Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the
equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom,
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enjoy these rights, even if the state refuses to recognize them.1 18
Although such rights are sometimes described as sacred or derived
from God, they are also rights that human beings enjoy as members of
society.119

Natural law concepts can be traced back to biblical times, as
well as to philosophers such as Aristotle, Cicero, and Grotius. 120
However, John Locke's work was a major philosophical source for
human rights, as well as for IP natural rights property theorists. 121
Courts and scholars have offered natural rights analyses when
seeking theoretical justifications to support IP laws. 122
These natural rights are distinct from rights that are granted
by the state for a specific, limited purpose. 123 With state-granted
rights, the state does not have an obligation to recognize the right but
chooses to enable the citizenry to enjoy certain rights with the
expectation that the rights will serve their intended purpose. Such
rights are more limited than natural rights, which are inherent and
inalienable. 124 Thus, patents and copyrights, when analyzed through
a consequentialist lens, are state-granted rights circumscribed by the
justice and peace in the world[.]"); id. art. 1 ("All human beings are born free and equal in dignity
and rights.").
118.

ARYEH NEIER, THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT: A HISTORY 32 (2012)

("[T]his concept of human rights requires a commitment to three principles: that rights are
natural and, therefore, inherent in all human beings and not only in those who derive them from
their relationship to a particular entity or political regime; that all are equal in their entitlement
to rights; and that rights are universal and, therefore, applicable everywhere.").
119.
Id.
120.
Id.
121.
Id. at 36 (citing John Locke, An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End
of Civil Government, in SOCIAL CONTRACT: ESSAYS BY LOCKE, HUME AND ROUSSEAU 1, 5-8
(Oxford Univ. Press 1960) ("Locke's description embodies the essential elements of human rights:
namely, that rights have their foundation in natural law and, therefore, are not dependent on
particular circumstances that prevail at particular times and places; that all are equal in their
entitlement to enjoy and exercise rights; and that they are universal in their application to all
human beings and not only to those who are nationals or citizens of a particular political
regime.").
122.
See MERGES, supra note 11, at 32-33; Gordon, supra note 14, at 1540.
Oguamanam, supra note 2, at 108 ("Historically rooted in continental European
123.
approaches to intellectual property, the crux of natural rights thinking is that creators' or
inventors' entitlement to their work is akin to an inherent natural right which the state is under
an obligation to protect and enforce.").
124.
Id. at 110-11 ("[I]ntellectual property rights, for the most part, are statutorily
created rights rather than inherent and inalienable natural rights. Statutes, case law, and
contracts, including general common law traditions and other regulatory and quasi-regulatory
regimes, control the ambit of rights over intellectual products, taking such rights well outside
natural rights' unfettered terrain. Traditionally, special exceptions or rights are created under
common law and statute reflecting the non-absolute character of rights to intellectual property.
Notable in these regards are such accommodations relating to education, 'fair use,' 'fair dealing'
... and other uses in relation to copyright works." (footnotes omitted)).
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goals they are intended to serve. When analyzed as human rights,
they become a natural entitlement. 125
Some scholars may dispute the characterization of the material
and moral interests arising from one's creations as natural rights.
Aryeh Neier, for instance, posits that the civil and political rights, but
not the social and cultural rights, are derived from natural rights
philosophies. 12 6 The civil and political rights include the rights
outlined in the first twenty-one articles of the UDHR and in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 127 The
economic, social, and cultural rights include those enumerated in the
ICESCR. The basis for a human right to IP is among the social and
cultural rights, rather than the civil and political rights.1 28
While the civil and political rights are, generally speaking,
individual rights that limit the ability of the state to interfere with the
individual, their social and economic counterparts include collective
rights and rights that aim to promote prosperity and security. 129
These social and cultural rights, Neier suggests, may not have the
same theoretical foundation as the civil and political rights. 130
As noted, human rights claims to IP can be based on the right
to the moral and material interests arising from one's creative work or
from the right to property. 13 1 The human right that intersects with
copyright and patent protection is the right to moral and material
interests arising from one's creations. 132 Another basis for claiming a
human right to IP is the right to property.1 33 It is the right to property
that most closely aligns with natural rights theories of IP. The right
to property falls within the civil and political rights.1 34 Meanwhile,
the right to material and moral interests is among the economic,
social, and cultural rights. 135 Human rights scholars sometimes refer
to these categories as the "first generation" and "second generation"

125.

See discussion infra Part IV.

126.

NEIER, supra note 118, at 36.

G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 2
127.
(Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR]; UIDHR, supra note 19, arts. 1-21.
128.
ICESCR, supra note 93, art. 15; UDHR, supranote 19, art. 27.
129.
See NEIER, supra note 118, at 64 (comparing civil and political rights with social and
economic rights).
Id. at 63 (explaining that economic and social rights derive from the nineteenth
130.
century and are not based on seventeenth-century thought about natural law).
See ICESCR, supra note 93, art. 15; UDHR, supranote 19, art. 27.
131.
UIDHR, supra note 19, art. 27(2).
132.
Id. art. 17.
133.
Id.; see MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW 182 (2001).
134.
ICESCR, supra note 93, art. 15.
135.
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rights, respectively. 13 6 If one accepts this distinction between the civil
and political rights and the social and cultural rights, then the extent
to which patents, copyright, and trademarks are recognized as
"property" could also influence the natural rights basis for human
rights claims to IP.
A theoretical and practical hierarchy between the civil and
political rights and the economic, social, and cultural rights is a source
of debate and criticism in the human rights literature. 137 Modern
human rights law, however, has rejected these categorizations as
creating false distinctions. 1 38
Furthermore, the idea of economic,
social, and cultural rights is not antithetical to a natural rights
regime. 139 The UDHR recognizes "the inherent dignity and ...
the
equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family,"
without distinguishing civil and political rights from economic, social,
and cultural rights. 140 Thus, for the purposes of this Article, both the
so-called first-generation and second-generation human rights are
treated as inherent in human beings by virtue of their humanity 41
and are analyzed as natural rights.
Eric Engle, Universal Human Rights: A GenerationalHistory, 12 ANN. SURV. INT'L

&

136.

COMP. L. 219, 256-58 (2006).
137.
ICCPR, supra note 127, art 1; see id., pmbl. (recognizing that "the ideal of free
human beings enjoying civil and political freedom and freedom from fear and want can only be
achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his civil and political rights, as
well as his economic, social and cultural rights"); see also ICESCR, supra note 93, pmbl.

(recognizing similarly that "the ideal of free human beings enjoying freedom from fear and want
can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his economic, social
and cultural rights, as well as his civil and political rights"); Peggy Ducoulombier, Interaction
Between Human Rights: Are All Human Rights Equal?, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN
RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 39, 39 (Christophe Geiger ed., 2015) ("What is more

precisely rejected is the assertion that first-generation rights, i.e. civil and political rights, are
superior to second-generation rights, i.e. social, economic, and cultural rights.").
138.
See UDHR, supra note 19, pmbl.; MICHELINE R. ISHAY, THE HISTORY OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 273, 294-95 (2004).
139.

JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 174 (2d ed. 2011) ("For the

objective of justice is not equality but the common good, the flourishing of all members of the
community[.]").
140.

UDHR, supra note 19, pmbl.; PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL

HUMAN RIGHTS 277-78 (2013) (explaining the official position that the rights contained in the
UDHR, the ICESCR, and the ICCPR are "universal, indivisible, and interdependent").
141.
What Are
Human Rights?, U.N.
HUM. RTS.
OFF.
HIGH COMM'R,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Pages/WhatareHumanRights.aspx
[https://perma.cclUSY7SYUV] (last visited Sept. 24, 2017). The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights explains:
Human rights are rights inherent to all human beings, whatever our nationality,
place of residence, sex, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, language, or any
other status. We are all equally entitled to our human rights without discrimination.
These rights are all interrelated, interdependent and indivisible. Universal human
rights are often expressed and guaranteed by law, in the forms of treaties, customary
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C. Implications of a Human Right to IP
IP laws play a distinct role from human rights laws. Unlike
human rights, it is not among the expressed goals of patent,
trademark, or copyright law to promote individual dignity, freedom,
justice, or peace.1 42 In light of the admirable goals of the UDHR, one
may be inclined to conclude that importing human rights principles
into IP law would lead to IP laws that are somehow preferable, and
even morally superior, to rights created by the state for a specific
purpose.1 43 As discussed, advocates of a human rights approach to IP
suggest that human rights philosophies will result in a more balanced
Indeed, human rights framing may have some
IP system.1 44
advantages. However, to the extent that it could be deployed to
bolster natural rights property claims, it may not be a remedy for
excessive IP protections that interfere with human flourishing.
Assuming there is a human right to IP protection, 4 5 it does not
automatically follow that injecting human rights law into IP law will
lead to positive outcomes. From a developing country perspective, for
instance, elevating IP rights to the status of human rights could
enforce a model of IP protection that is not universally accepted. 146 As
Ruth Okediji points out, the international IP norms that have been
established through the TRIPS Agreement are based predominantly
on Western values, which tend to be more individualistic than the
values held in non-Western societies.1 47 In addition, according IP
rights the status of fundamental human rights may further hinder the
right to development, for example.1 48
international law, general principles and other sources of international law.
International human rights law lays down obligations of Governments to act in
certain ways or to refrain from certain acts, in order to promote and protect human
rights and fundamental freedoms of individuals or groups.
Id.
142.
See Sub-Commission on Human Rights Res. 2000/7, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/, ¶ 11
(Aug. 17, 2000).
143.
See UJDHR, supra note 19, pmbl. (proclaiming that human dignity and equality "is
the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world" and noting that the members of the
United Nations "have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in

larger freedom").
144.
Carpenter, supra note 83, at 313; see Helfer, supra note 10, at 974-76; Chidi
Oguamanam, Indigenous Peoples' Rights at the Intersection of Human Rights and Intellectual

PropertyRights, 18 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 261, 282-84 (2014); infra Part IV.
145.
Cf. Special Rapporteur's Cultural Rights Report, supra note 109, ¶ 5 ("Although the
human right to science and culture does not establish a human right to patent protection, it does
provide a human rights framework within which to consider patent policy.").
146.
Gana, supra note 92, at 340.
147.
Id. at 340-41.
148.
Id. at 338 (discussing challenges in implementing the right to development).
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The characterization of IP can affect how it is perceived and
treated by policymakers, judges, and the public. 14 9
Treating
copyrights, patents, and trademarks as property, for example, leads to
a different analysis than if these interests are not viewed as
"property." Likewise, if society recognizes patent protection as a
human right, it may be subjected to different legal treatment. Patent
rights, viewed purely as state-granted entitlements, should have a
limited scope and duration, whereas a natural right to patent
protection is more readily justified as having an extended term and
limited scrutiny before the patent is granted.15 0 Significantly, if
patent protection is treated as a human right, it would strengthen the
patent holder's claim vis-A-vis human rights-such as the right to food
or education-that directly affect quality of life and human
flourishing.151

On the other hand, human rights law may require that
precedence be given to relieving hunger instead of protecting financial
interests, particularly if the right holder has met, or exceeded, her
basic needs.1 52 It matters, therefore, whether IP rights are considered
natural rights based on labor theory, human rights, or limited
state-granted rights. This is a theoretical inquiry that can have
practical implications. The nature of the rights should influence the
design of IP laws, including the question of who is treated as the
primary beneficiary of these laws. 153
For example, if patents are justified purely under a
consequentialist theory, 154 but one has a natural entitlement to
food,155 then access to food should take priority over patent rights.
149.
See Gregory N. Mandel, The Public Perception of Intellectual Property, 66 FLA. L.
REV. 261, 279-91 (2014).
150.
See, e.g., Mossoff, supra note 11, at 956-58 (explaining that the utilitarian narrative
has been used to characterize the shift from treating patents as privileges to the property
paradigm rights and the corresponding expansion of intellectual property rights, and suggesting
that the "propertization" critique is wrong because the patent right was never a privilege).
151.

Rochelle Dreyfuss, Patents and Human Rights: Where is the Paradox? 2 (N.Y. Univ.

Law Sch., Pub. Law Research, Paper No. 06-29, 2006), http://ssrn.com/abstract=929498
[https://perma.cclWXB4-3SWS] ("Elevating intellectual property rights to human rights has
unfortunate pragmatic consequences. Presumably, human rights can be outweighed only by
other human rights. Accordingly, under a human rights approach, the benefit stream flowing
from inventive production can be distributed, without a patentee's authorization, only to meet
social needs that are likewise classified as fundamental.").
152.
U.N. ESCOR, 27th Sess. ¶¶ 4, 8, 15, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2001/15 (Dec. 14, 2001).
153.
For instance, should the laws be designed primarily with the interests of the creator
in mind, or primarily with the interests of the public in mind, or should these interests be
equally weighted?
154.
Cf. Sigrid Sterckx, The Moral Justifiability of Patents, 13 J. EUR. ETHICS NETWORK
249, 249 (2006) (arguing that patents are not a consequentialist theory).
155.
ICESCR, supra note 93, art. 11; UDHR, supra note 19, art. 25.
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However, if one enjoys a natural right to patent protection, then the
claim that a right to food should prevail would be weakened.
Existing laws often give preference to real property over
human needs. Those who have abundant food are not obligated to
share-even the excess-with those in need. But stealing food is a
crime, even if one is starving.1 56 IP rights, however, may not warrant
There are various
the same deference 'as tangible property.
justifications for the treatment of physical property that are unrelated
to the question of whether there is a natural right to property. IP,
unlike tangible property, is generally considered to be nonrivalrous
and nonexcludable. 15 7 This means there can be multiple users at one
time. 15 8 Furthermore, there are reasons, such as maintaining social
order and avoiding violence, for protecting property in a democratic,
capitalist system. 159 Such justifications are inapplicable to intangible
goods.
A human rights approach to IP should, according to some
human rights experts, focus on the needs of disadvantaged and
marginalized individuals and communities. 160 From this perspective,
any human right to copyright or patent should be limited to natural
persons. 16 1 This vision of a human right to IP would focus on the
human individual-particularly the members of society most in need
of protection-while excluding corporations from the scope of such
protection. 162 Unfortunately, human rights-based IP claims have
neither been limited to human persons nor aimed at protecting the
most vulnerable members of society. 163

156.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 812.014 (2017) (ruling petty theft a misdemeanor in the State
of Florida). But see Dominique Mosbergen, Stealing Small Amounts of Food When in Desperate
Need Is Not a Crime, Rules Italy's Highest Court, HUFFINGTON POST (May 4, 2016, 12:20 AM),

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/stealing-food-not-a-crimeitaly-us_57296b6fe4b016f378941ef9 [https://perma.cc/BRQ2-4X66].
157.
See David W. Barnes, Congestible Intellectual Property and Impure Public Goods, 9
Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 533, 533 (2011) (explaining the nonrivalrous nature of IP and the
possibility that some IP rights are partially rivalrous).
158.
Id. at 533-34 ("If a good is non-rivalrous, 'it is costless to allow additional consumers
simultaneously to enjoy the benefits of a public good once it has been produced.' If a good is
'non-excludable,' it is difficult for producers to get consumers to pay for the privilege of using it."
(footnotes omitted)).
See GREEN, supra note 59, at 139-40 (discussing theft laws and remedies for loss of
159.
property and seven factors that justify criminalizing theft).
U.N. ESCOR, 27th Sess. ¶¶ 4, 8, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2001/15 (Dec. 14, 2001).
160.
See id. TT 4-6 (detailing the importance of authors' rights in intellectual property
161.
and humans as a central subject).

162.
Id. ¶¶ 5-7 ("Human rights are fundamental as they derive from the human person
as such[.]").
See Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, 2007-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 41, 57, 63 (2007).
163.
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For example, in the European case of Anheuser-Busch v.
Portugal, the owner of the Budweiser mark for beer successfully
claimed a human right to its trademark interest based on the
acceptance of IP as "property" and as a "human right" under European
human rights law. 164 If the court had not considered a trademark
interest to be "property" that falls within the scope of protected human
rights under the relevant law, there would have been no clear legal
basis upon which Anheuser-Busch could ground its human rights
claim. 165 Even though Anheuser-Busch, a major corporation, 166 did
not prevail in the dispute, it is significant that the court expressly
recognized IP rights as protected property under European human
rights law. 167
One could dismiss this jurisprudence as irrelevant in the US
context due to the differences between US and European legal
systems. Indeed, the Anheuser-Busch decision was based on European
implementation of human rights law. 168 However, there has been
increased harmonization in IP law, partly due to the global and
trans-border nature of many IP-protected goods. US jurisprudence
has influenced the law in other countries, but the laws from other
nations are also affecting US law. For example, to bring its patent
law in line with the rest of the world, the United States recently
moved to a system that awards the patent right to the first applicant
to file for patent protection, instead of to the first inventor.169
Id. at 57, 69.
164.
See id. at 57-58. In other words, Anheuser was able to claim a human right related
165.
to its trademark because the trademark interest was recognized as property by the court. Id. at
51-54.
Id. at 47 ("The applicant is an American public company whose registered office is in
166.
Saint Louis, Missouri (United States of America). It produces and sells beer under the brand
name

'Budweiser'

in a

number of countries

around

the world.").

Anheuser-Busch

was

subsequently purchased by a Belgian company and is now AB InBev. See Anheuser Will be
Bought by Belgian InBev for $50 Billion, REUTERS (Aug. 5, 2010, 1:05 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/id/25665930 [https://perma.ce/2TS2-E3WQ].
Id. at 65, 69 ("In the light of the above-mentioned decisions, the Grand Chamber
167.
agrees with the Chamber's conclusion that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is applicable to intellectual
property as such."); see also id. at 71 (Steiner & Hajiyev, JJ., concurring) ("We agreed with the
majority that there has been no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, but on other grounds. In
our view, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 does apply, in general, to intellectual property. This was
accepted by both the parties but there has never been any clear statement of this principle by the
Court in the past. We therefore agree that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is applicable to intellectual
property in general and to a duly registered trade mark.").
Id. at 50-55 (majority opinion).
168.
See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011)
169.
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). When the Leahy-Smith America Invents
Act (AIA) was signed into law on September 16, 2011, "it adopted the first-to-file system of
determining a patent's priority date." Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the
America Invents Act: Part I ofll, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 435, 435 (2011). The ALA also "redefined what
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Furthermore,
large multinational corporations-including
US
companies-operate across borders. Such businesses may articulate
their claims under international human rights law in some
jurisdictions but as constitutional rights in others. 170 The terminology
used may be distinct, but human rights obligations are often
enshrined as constitutional rights.17 1
Arguably, corporations should not enjoy human rights to IP
protection. Even if corporations have legal rights, such rights should
not be accorded the same status as the rights human beings enjoy by
virtue of their humanity. 172 Ideally, human rights frameworks will
distinguish human rights entitlements from copyrights, patents, and
trademarks. This is critical, particularly since there is a great deal of
IP that is owned by corporations. 173 If this distinction is maintained, a
human rights approach to IP could counter corporate expansion of IP
protections.
However, to the extent corporate property interests are
protected as fundamental rights under regional human rights
instruments or national constitutions, the human rights framework
may not be a particularly effective restraint on IP rights.
If
corporations can protect their IP by making human rights claims, as
was done in Anheuser-Busch, human rights framing could further the
upward trend in IP protection that has already resulted from the
trade-related and investment-related treatment of IP.174
Still, the human rights discourse, which tends to be
internationalist, can enrich the domestic natural rights IP discourse.
constitutes prior art against a patent, created several new post-issuance proceedings for patents
and revised existing proceedings, and made many other important changes to the patent code."
Id. ("The AIA is the first comprehensive patent bill to be enacted since the Patent Act of 1952 ...
and it arguably makes the most substantial changes to the law since those imposed by the
Patent Act of 1836[,] . . . which created the system of patent examination.").
170.
See Anheuser-Busch 2007-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 45, 49-50; Matal, supra note 169, at 451.
171.
See Gerald L. Neuman, Human Rights and Constitutional Rights: Harmony and
Dissonance, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1863, 1866 (2003) ("[Clonsensual sources of constitutional rights
may also provide guidance in the interpretation of the rights, under different interpretive
methodologies.").
172.
H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHL. REV. 175, 176-77 (1955)
("[T]here may be codes of conduct quite properly termed moral codes ... which do not employ the
notion of a right. . . . There is . . . no simple identification to be made between moral and legal

rights, but there is an intimate connection between the two[.]").
173.
See Special Rapporteur's Cultural Rights Report, supra note 109, ¶¶ 17, 21, 32. The
Special Rapporteur has argued for this framework; however, this question is more complicated
than it may appear. For instance, could copyright or patent protection be the method by which
the state implements its human rights obligation? This question goes beyond the scope of the
present project, but is worth further consideration. For data on corporate ownership of IP, see
PATENT TECH. MONITORING TEAM, supra note 38.

174.

See Part II.B.
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The human rights framework diverges from classic IP theories in
some important respects, which are analyzed in Part VI of this Article.
Before returning to the human rights framework, the next Part
discusses some of the classic justifications for intellectual property
protection.
IV. CLASSIC INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY THEORIES
Courts and theorists draw on a combination of philosophies to
justify IP rights.17 5 Copyright and patent laws, for example, are often
rationalized using both consequentialist and deontological theories. 176
However, utilitarianism remains the predominant theoretical
justification for IP rights in the United States. In particular, many
US scholars analyze the consequences of IP policy through the lens of
economic efficiency.177 In general, commentators who support less
restrictive IP protections rely on utilitarian theories,1 78 whereas some
scholars who resist access arguments turn to natural rights property
theories to justify strong IP rights. 179
A. The UtilitarianNorm
Utilitarian theories are based on the writings of philosophers
such as Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill.1 80

Bentham notably

175.
See Mossoff, supra note 14, at 36 (explaining that copyright is justified, "particularly
the labor theory of property and the social contract doctrine at the core of John Locke's political
philosophy"). See generally Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 569 U.S. 278 (2013) (denying farmers from
reusing patented seeds); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (upholding the Copyright Term
Extension Act); Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (finding
copyright violation despite claim of fair use for public interest).
176.
See William W. Fisher III, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEw ESSAYS IN THE
LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168, 174, 189 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001)
(discussing Lockean labor theories, personality theories and utilitarian theories such as reward
theory). See generally Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
31 (1989) (discussing utilitarian and natural rights justifications for intellectual property).
See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 35 (4th ed. 1992);
177.
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL
STUD. 325, 325 (1989); Richard Posner, Intellectual Property: The Law and Economics Approach,
19 J. ECON. PERSP. 57-58 (2005).
178.
See LESSIG, supra note 78, at 7, 57; James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement
and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 37-40 (2003);
Lemley, supra note 21, at 1328.
MERGES, supra note 11, at 95.
179.
180.
David 0. Brink, Mill's Ambivalence About Rights, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1669, 1669-70,
1675 (2010).
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rejected natural rights as "nonsense upon stilts."181 Thomas Jefferson,
who was a key figure in US patent law, 182 was also critical of the idea
of justifying IP through natural rights.1 83 Utilitarians instead see
rules as having a specific purpose, which is usually to maximize
welfare.18 4
Utilitarianism is typically classified as direct or indirect
utilitarianism, or "act utilitarianism" and "rule utilitarianism,"
respectively.18 5 Act utilitarianism assesses an act against its ability to
maximize general welfare, whereas rule utilitarianism evaluates a
rule against its general conformity to some norm that is widely
accepted as a good one.1 86 Modern utilitarianism in IP law typically
refers to economic theories that support the protection of copyrights
and patents in order to promote innovation and discourage free
riding.1 87 Thus, utilitarian approaches to IP are predominantly
concerned with the economic benefits of copyright and patent
protection. 188
IP rights are justified on the basis that they stimulate
innovation, thereby promoting societal progress. 8 9 In the United
States, scholars find support for the utilitarian approach to patents

181.
NEIER, supra note 118, at 37 (explaining how natural law has significant critics,
"such as the utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham who famously described natural rights as
nonsense upon stilts"').
182.
Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Lockean Arguments for Private Intellectual Property, in
NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY, supra note 176, at 138, 138

&

("Thomas Jefferson was the first administrator of the U.S. patent system[.]"); see also Mossoff,
supra note 11, at 954-57 (discussing and criticizing court decisions and scholarly articles that
treat Jefferson as the founder of US patent law).
183.
Shiffrin, supra note 182, at 138.
See id.
184.
See Brink, supra note 180, at 1671.
185.
Id. at 1671-72.
186.
Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV.
187.
1031, 1032-33 (2005).
Although utilitarianism is often equated with wealth maximization, the two are not
188.
the same. See Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism,Economics and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD.
103, 103, 111 (1979) ("The important question is whether utilitarianism and economics are really
the same thing. I believe they are not and, further, that the economic norm I shall call 'wealth
maximization' provides a firmer basis for a normative theory of law than does utilitarianism.").
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Gregory N. Mandel, Promoting
189.
Environmental Innovation with Intellectual Property Innovation: A New Basis For Patent
Rewards, 24 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 51, 54 (2005) (discussing how patent law serves as
a basis for environmental innovation). But see Stijepko Tokic, The Interplay Between User
Innovation, The Patent System and Product Liability Laws: Policy Implications, 99 J. PAT.
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 20, 21 (2016) (illuminating how the patent system may suppress
innovation).
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and copyrights in the US Constitution. 190 Article I, Clause 8 of the
Constitution gives Congress the authority to create laws to provide
authors and inventors time-limited patent and copyright protection to
promote "the progress of Science and the useful Arts." 191
According to incentive theory, creators need an economic
incentive to innovate and to create new products. 192 IP protection
creates this incentive and provides economic rewards for innovators
and creators. 193 The incentive to innovate is that the inventor who is
the first to seek patent protection will, assuming all the criteria for
patentability are met, obtain the exclusive right to make, use, and sell
the invention for twenty years from the date the patent application
was submitted.19 4 In exchange for the time-limited patent protection,
the inventor discloses the invention to the public. The public receives
the benefit of the invention and the knowledge about how to make the
invention.
This incentive theory, therefore, is not only about
rewarding the inventor but also about promoting the public interest.195
Thus, with a view to the public interest, patent law should promote
innovation, while copyright law should promote the dissemination of
knowledge.1 96
Natural rights approaches to IP, by comparison, demonstrate
greater concern for the interests of the creator than for the consuming
public. 197 The works of some natural rights IP scholars are discussed
below.

190.

Brett Frischmann & Mark P. McKenna, Intergenerational Progress, 2011 WIS. L.

REV. 123, 123 (2011).
191.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This clause in the Constitution is often referred to as
either the Patent Clause, the Copyright Clause, or the Intellectual Property Clause.
192.
See Moore, supranote 80, at 610-13.
193.
1 ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEM-LEY,
PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE: 2017, at 19-20 (2017).

194.
195.

INTELLECTUAL

TRIPS Agreement, supranote 23, arts. 28, 33.
Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark A. Lemley, The Audience in Intellectual Property

Infringement, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1251, 1262 (2014).

Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1, 8 (2010) ("A copyright
196.
system is designed to produce an ecology that nurtures the creation, dissemination, and
enjoyment of works of authorship. When it works well, it encourages creators to generate new

works, assists intermediaries in disseminating them widely, and supports readers, listeners, and
viewers in enjoying them." (footnotes omitted)).
197.
While many scholars see the utilitarian and natural rights approaches as being at
odds, some scholars see both approaches as landing at the same place. See Brian Frye,
Machiavellian Intellectual Property, 78 PiTT. L. REV. 1, 7 (2016) ("[Plroponents of intellectual
property have adopted moral theories in order to ignore evidence that intellectual property may
decrease social welfare, and detractors of intellectual property have adopted moral theories in
order to ignore evidence that intellectual property may increase social welfare.").
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B. NaturalRights Property Theories to Expand IP Rights
Although the utilitarian model is predominant, courts tend to
explain copyright law, for example, through a combination of
utilitarian and natural rights theories. 198 In addition, various scholars
have used natural rights theories to justify patent and copyright
protection. 199

Justin Hughes argues from a property-based natural rights
perspective that rights must be derived from a source other than the
laws that create those rights. 200 He therefore contends that the US
vision of property is informed by Lockean
constitutional
20 1 According to Locke's theory, once an individual mixes
justifications.
her labor with what previously belonged to the commons, she has a
right to claim it as her private property. 202 This Lockean labor is
"central to the legal definition and protection of property
entitlements." 203 According to this line of reasoning, intangible rights
are a form of property that can be justified based on the right to enjoy
the fruit of one's labors, 204 whether physical or mental. 205

198.
Gordon, supra note 14, at 1607-08; Adam Mossoff, What Is Property? Putting the
Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371, 425 (2003); Yen, supra note 18, at 524. But see Carys
J. Craig, Locke, Labour and Limiting the Author's Right: A Warning Against a Lockean Approach
to Copyright Law, 28 QUEEN'S L.J. 1, 34 (2002) (criticizing the Lockean approach to copyright).
Mossoff, supra note 14, at 39 ("The right to exclude in intellectual property
199.
entitlements exists by legal fiat. It is solely a creation of the law. . . . Thus, the exclusive rights
granted to copyright and patent holders appear arbitrary-they are only legal figments of our
collective social imagination. And these rights certainly do not fit the definition of property,
which as we are constantly reminded, is naturally exclusive." (emphasis added)). But see Shiffrin,
supra note 182, at 141 ("[The nature of intellectual works makes them less, rather than more,
susceptible to Lockean justifications for private appropriation.").
Hughes, supra note 21, at 288 ("Rights in our society cannot depend for their
200.
justification solely upon statutory or constitutional provisions.").
201.
Id.
202.
Id. at 297-98; see JOHN LOCKE, Second Treatise of Government, in Two TREATISES
OF GOVERNMENT 267, 287-88 (Peter Laslett ed., student ed. 1988) ("The Labour of his Body, and
the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the
State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned to it
something that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property. It being by him removed from the
common state Nature hath placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it, that
excludes the common right of other Men.").
Mossoff, supra note 14, at 41.
203.
Id. at 39-40 ("The right to exclude in intellectual property entitlements exists by
204.
legal fiat. It is solely a creation of the law. . . . Thus, the exclusive rights granted to copyright and
patent holders appear arbitrary-they are only legal figments of our collective social
imagination. And these rights certainly do not fit the definition of property, which, as we are
constantly reminded, is naturally exclusive. . . . This does not mean that these rights are not
property rights. It means that they are only a different type of property right-but a property
right nonetheless." (emphasis added)). But see generally Shiffrin, supra note 182.

2017]

HUMANIZING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

239

With some exceptions, 206 natural rights rationales are utilized
to explain and support extensive IP rights. 207 Adam Mossoff describes
the recent expansion of patent rights as consistent with the "similarly
expansive development of patent rights under the guiding influence of
natural rights philosophy in the early nineteenth century." 208 Since,
according to this theory, the laborer is entitled to protect her property
from others, the rights can be relatively strong, even if there is no
contribution to some broader societal purpose. 20 9 According to Adam
Moore, a Lockean justification for IP means term limits should not be
imposed on creators and inventors. 210 Both IP scholars and members
of the consuming public who believe in a natural entitlement to
copyright or patent protection hold the view that creators are entitled
to robust IP rights. 211

205.

Mossoff, supra note 14, at 42; Mossoff, supra note 11, at 997 ("In summary,

nineteenth-century

case law provides substantial support for Madison's declaration in The

FederalistNo. 43 that patent rights were justified 'with equal reason' as the labor-based property
justification for common-law copyright. Patents were indeed privileges--civil rights securing
property rights." (footnotes omitted)). But see Hettinger, supra note 176, at 40-41 ("[The]
argument that people are naturally entitled to the fruits of their labor is distinct from the
argument that a person has a claim to labor's fruits based on desert. . . . The desert argument

suggests that the laborer deserves to benefit from her labor, at least if it is an attempt to do
something worthwhile. This proposal is convincing, but does not show that what the laborer
deserves is property rights in the object labored on. The mistake is to conflate the created object
which makes a person deserving of a reward with what that reward should be.").
206.

Gordon, supra note 14, at 1538. See generally Yen, supra note 18.

207.
See Mossoff, supra note 14, at 41; Intellectual
https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/white-collar-crime/piracy-ip-theft
("Intellectual property theft involves robbing people or companies
creative expressions-known as 'intellectual property'-which can

Property Theft/Piracy, FBI,
[https://perma.cc/6G5K-6W5C]
of their ideas, inventions, and
include everything from trade

secrets and proprietary products and parts to movies, music, and software."); see also Haxorcat,

Piracy
It's
a
Crime,
YOUTUBE
(Dec.
4,
2007),
https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v-HmZm8vNHBSU [https://perma.cc/4AMM-PR84] [hereinafter Anti-Piracy Campaign].
See generally Mossoff, supra note 11.
208.
Mossoff, supra note 11, at 1011 ("The expansion in patent rights today is in accord
with the similarly expansive development in patent rights under the guiding influence of natural
rights philosophy in the early nineteenth century.").
209.
Id.
210.
Moore, supra note 11, at 103-04 ("While I find [Robert] Nozick's suggestion for
limiting intellectual property rights with respect to discoveries convincing, I do not think a
similar case can be made for intellectual works that are created. Moreover, I do not find the
prospect for perpetual rights for created intellectual works alarming. Suppose that so long as
authors and inventors and their heirs defend property claims, these rights are perpetual, similar
to property rights in tangible objects.").
211.
Mandel, supra note 149, at 279-91 (finding that individuals who took a natural
rights approach to intellectual property tended to support stronger intellectual property
protections).
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In addition, some commentators see natural rights as providing
a basis to resist demands for access to intangible goods. 2 12 Robert
Merges, for example, objects to assertions that it is harmful to expose
society to goods protected by IP and then limit access to those goods. 2 13
While he acknowledges the principle that the property owner should
"prevent harm," 214 he contends that IP rights should be limited only
when people are in dire need. 2 15 According to this reasoning, even
though cultural development may be important for human flourishing,
for example, such claims would not be particularly strong. 216 The
clear tension between the individual interest, whether corporate or
human, and the community interest would therefore be resolved in
favor of the individual property owner.
As discussed, natural rights theories tend to be employed to
support arguments for more expansive IP protection for both
individuals and corporations. 2 1 7 Nonetheless, as the next Section
outlines, some commentators use natural rights property models to
argue for limits on IP.
C. Natural Rights Property Theories to Limit IP Rights
Although the trend is to the contrary, some scholars contend
that natural rights property theories place effective limits on IP.
These scholars view natural rights theories of IP as preferable for both
creators and society. 2 18
Alfred Yen posits that once a work is published, copyright
protection cannot be based on a natural entitlement but must instead
be limited to what is granted by statute. 219 Yen draws on Locke's
labor theory and Roman natural law to argue, in contrast to some
natural rights scholars, that the natural law of property only extends
to things that can be possessed. 220 According to this argument,
property is defined by occupation and possession. 221 Once the work
has been published and distributed to the public, it is no longer in the
212.
MERGES, supra note 11, at 54. Merges, for instance, objects to arguments supporting
what he sees as a restrictive vision of intellectual property rights. See id. at 54-55.
Id. at 54-55.
213.
Id. at 69.
214.
215.
Id. at 64 ("[I]n my view IP rights are only limited in actual cases where IP is
enforced in a way that interferes with sustenance or survival.").

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Id. at 64-65.
See Mossoff, supra note 11, at 1011.
See, e.g., Shiffrin, supra note 14, at 657-58; Yen, supra note 18, at 521.
Yen, supra note 18, at 550-51.
Id. at 552-53.
Id. at 550.

2017]

HUMANIZING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

241

possession of the creator and protection is no longer justified on the
basis of natural law. 2 2 2

Wendy Gordon suggests that natural rights theories will lead
to the appropriate balance between the interests of the creators and
users. 223 She argues that a natural rights approach to IP law takes
into consideration not only the rights of the creator, but also the
property interests of the public. This is because Lockean theory does
not permit one to harm others. 224 Accordingly, the public cannot be
harmed in order to protect the interests of the creator. Further, once
the work is created, withdrawal could cause harm; in that case, the
public may have a reliance argument. 225
Likewise, Seana Shiffrin argues that Lockean analysis will
lead to the appropriate balance between creators and users. Her
analysis is based on the principle that appropriation must not be
wasteful. 226 Removing something from the state of nature to take as
individual property is consistent with God's grant only when the
taking is useful or beneficial. 227 In addition, Shiffrin contends that
Locke's appropriation theory makes sense with respect to physical
property but not intangible goods. This is because exclusive use may
be necessary for the full and effective use of land and tangible goods
but not for intangible goods. 228 Unlike physical goods, she argues, the

222.
Id. at 551.
223.
Gordon, supra note 14, at 1561-62. But see Gregory S. Alexander, The Social
Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 754 (2009) ("As Joseph
Singer has pointed out, 'It is well understood that owners cannot use their property to harm

others, but it is not well understood how difficult it is to define what that means.' The problem
with using the harm principle as the basis for defining social obligations of ownership is that it
misleads owners into believing that William Blackstone's description of ownership as conferring
on owners 'sole and despotic dominion' over their property is accurate." (footnotes omitted)).
224.
Gordon, supra note 14, at 1544 ("We cannot 'earn' a right to harm others, or a right
to impair their access to the common." (footnotes omitted)).
225.
Id. at 1567-68.
226.
Shiffrin, supra note 182, at 147 ("These criteria ensure that appropriation does not
disadvantage the equal rights of others to appropriate some goods and to use others, and to
ensure that the common stock is not depleted past the point of fruitful use. Wasteful
appropriation would frustrate the charge to make the common grant work to humankind's
benefit.").
Id. at 146-47.
227.
228.
Id. at 152 ("Why then must the use of 'extra' land be exclusive to facilitate full
exploitation of God's gift? ... The land would not be as effectively used if a user's plans could be
disrupted by the imposition of another's inconsistent plan or spontaneous use. It would then
make some sense that he endorsed private, nonconsensual appropriation of some things beyond
what is necessary to subsist. Their appropriation would be justified where exclusive use of such
thing is necessary for their fully effective use." (footnotes omitted)). Shiffrin discusses Locke's
objections to '"patent' (copyright-like) clauses on the grounds that they.granted a monopoly to
publishers" and his seeming disapproval of copyright expansion. Id. at 154-56 (emphasis added)
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full exploitation of intangible goods requires nonexclusive use rather
than exclusive use. 2 29 Shiffrin therefore concludes that Lockean labor
theory cannot serve as the theoretical justification for strong IP
rights. 230
When comparing natural rights IP scholarship with human
rights approaches to IP, the distinction between the individual and the
community becomes an important aspect. Human rights IP theories
advance the community of individuals. At the same time, human
rights framing offers a model for preserving the interests of the
individual. However, the individual interest must be assessed in light
of the competing interests of the multiple individuals who form part of
the human community.
V. THE COMMUNITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL LABORER
A central issue in modern IP debates is how to balance
competing rights and interests. Compared to natural rights property
theories, which tend to bolster arguments that prioritize the creator's
individual interests, 231 utilitarian IP theories are concerned with
incentivizing innovation and maximizing welfare by concentrating on
the greater good. 2 3 2 This distinction influences the perception of IP
rights, including who is the primary beneficiary of the relevant laws.
A. Utilitarianismand the Public Interest
Unlike human rights, IP utilitarianism is not based on the
inherent dignity of the human being. 2 3 3 Rather, the laws are designed

("Generally one's use or consumption of an idea, proposition, concept, expression, method, and so

forth, is fully compatible with others' use, even their simultaneous use.").
Id. at 141 ("I mean to criticize the claim that Lockean theory, as I suggest it is most
229.
plausibly interpreted, generally supports the assertion of strong, natural rights over most
intellectual products."). Shiffrin defines strong intellectual property rights to mean "those core
intellectual property rights that empower their bearers to exert exclusive control over access to
and use of intellectual works." Id. at 142. Shiffrin concludes that Lockean natural rights theory
is not well suited to intellectual property. Id. at 158-66.
Id. at 166 ("If effective exploitation of the grant of the world is a value that propels
230.
Locke's arguments for ownership, then, since free, shared use of intellectual products contributes
to their effective exploitation, this sort of property seems unamenable to private appropriation
that manifests in strong rights."). But see Mossoff, supra note 14, at 36 (arguing that nineteenth
century protections of intellectual property-trademarks and trade secrets in particular-are
rooted in "the courts' belief that such rights were similar to other property rights born of
valuable labor and protected by the law").
231.
See Mossoff, supranote 11, at 956.
232.

MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note 193, at 11-14.

&

233.
Mirela V. Hristova, Are Intellectual Property Rights Human Rights?, 93 J. PAT.
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 339, 351-52 (2001).
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with a view to promoting some public good. 2 3 4 A utilitarian theory of
IP values the rights of the creator, even though its primary aim is not
to protect the interests of the individual creator. 235 Innovators and
creators enjoy protection for the purpose of producing some societal
benefit. 236 Arguably, this can result in the individual being sacrificed
for the good of the many. 2 37 Thus, one critique of utilitarianism is that
it can be oppressive when taken to extremes because the goal of
utilitarianism is to maximize welfare. 238
Despite this criticism, under the current model IP producers
are not oppressed for the benefit of the masses. 239
Rather, the
producer-centered system is the reason for much of the concern about
the current global rules. 240 Arguably, the current system overprotects
the interests of producers and owners of IP goods, sometimes to the
detriment of users. 24 1 Despite the language of utilitarianism, IP rights
are increasingly treated as natural entitlements. 24 2
The existing model of IP utilitarianism has been questioned by
some commentators because of its focus on wealth maximization. 243
Indeed, numerous scholars have offered utilitarian interpretations of
IP progress that are not about maximizing wealth.244 Some scholars
contend that a natural rights vision of copyright, for example, can lead
234.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
235.
Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV.
1745, 1754-55 (2013).
236.
Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 969 (1990) ("The purpose of
copyright law is to encourage authorship. When we embody that encouragement in property
rights for authors, we can lose sight of a crucial distinction: Nurturing authorship is not
necessarily the same thing as nurturing authors. When individual authors claim that they are
entitled to incentives that would impoverish the milieu in which other authors must also work,
we must guard against protecting authors at the expense of the enterprise of authorship.").
237.
Sunder, supra note 1, at 284 (focusing "simply as the maximization of creative
output[,] . . . [t]he utilitarian approach to intellectual property does not ask: Who makes the
goods? Who profits, and at whose expense?").
238.
Id. ("Martha Nussbaum describes this as 'the problem of respect for the separate
person."').
239.
See, e.g., Canada-PatentProtectionPanel Report, supra note 53, 1 4.14(iv).
Sunder, supra note 1, at 263.
240.
241.
Oguamanam, supra note 2, at 152-53 (discussing North-South tensions relating to
intellectual property).
242.
Craig, supra note 198, at 12-13.
243.
But see Posner, supra note 188, at 103, 111-12 ("The important question is whether
utilitarianism and economics are really the same thing. I believe they are not and, further, that
the economic norm I shall call 'wealth maximization' provides a firmer basis for a normative
theory of law than does utilitarianism.").
244.
See Cynthia M. Ho, Do Patents Promote the Progressof Justice? Reflections on Varied
Visions of Justice, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 469, 469 (2005); Malla Pollack, What Is Congress
Supposed to Promote?: Defining "Progress"in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States
Constitution, or Introducing the Progress Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV. 754, 755-56 (2001).
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to more balance because inherent in natural rights analysis is a
recognition that IP is about more than wealth creation. 245 In line with
the utilitarian concern for the public good, some commentators have
advocated a return to referring to IP protections as privileges rather
than rights. 246 Concerned with the expanding scope of IP rights,
others have lamented the "propertization" of copyright, patents, and
trademarks. 247 Clearly, there is some doubt about whether the
utilitarian model of IP is effective in balancing the interests of
creators with those of the public. 248
In theory, the focus on the greater good-on advancing the
interests of the greatest number of individuals-distinguishes
utilitarianism from natural rights approaches to IP. Certainly, it has
been suggested that utilitarian theories can accommodate moral
rightS 249 and that both theories may ultimately lead to the same
outcome. 250 This Article does not engage that debate, but instead
compares two natural rights models-one of which appears to be more
likely to advance the common good.
Even without engaging the question of distributive justice,
human rights frameworks can shift the natural rights property-centric
IP discussion towards analyses that accord greater value to competing
nonproprietary rights and interests.
245.

25 1

A human rights approach,

OseiTutu, supra note 71, at 27, 44 (suggesting that utilitarian IP law does not have

to be about wealth maximization but can promote human progress in economic and noneconomic

ways). But see Yen, supra note 18, at 520 ("Under the economic copyright model, the propriety of
copyright's expansion rests solely on an economic cost-benefit calculation.").
246.

PETER DRAHOs, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 212 (1996).

247.
Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a PropertyParadigm, 54
DUKE L.J. 1, 1 (2004); Craig, supra note 198, at 15; Mossoff, supra note 11, at 956 n.15.
Lemley, supra note 21, at 1334-35 ("The decidedly ambiguous nature of this
248.
evidence should trouble us as IP lawyers, scholars, and policymakers. It is one thing to say in
Fritz Machlup's day that we should trust in theory because the evidence isn't in yet. In the
absence of evidence, he might well have been right that the best thing to do is maintain the
status quo. But it is quite another thing to continue trusting in theory when we have gone out,
collected the evidence, and found that it is far from clear that IP is doing the world more good
than harm.").
249.
See, e.g., Adrian Brown, Can UtilitarianismAccommodate Moral Rights?, 2 UCL
JURIS. REV. 16, 26 (1995); Gustavo Hessmann Dalaqua, John Stuart Mill vs. John Rawls: A
Comparison, 8 SEARA FILOSOFICA, 61, 67-68 (2014).

250.

Fromer, supra note 235, at 1761-64; David A. Reidy, Philosophy and Human Rights:

Some Contemporary Perspectives, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 23, 31-32

(Claudio Corredetti ed., 2012) ("John Rawls is best known for his theory of social or distributive
justice.. . . On Rawls's view, then, human rights as universal moral rights, basic human rights
or human rights proper, are those rights that all peoples . . . secure as constitutional or civic
rights within their own borders[.]").

Human rights approaches may import distributive justice considerations into the
251.
utilitarian economic IP framework. See Lang, supra note 6, at 410 ("Human rights discourse also
focuses our attention on questions of distributive justice. Bureaucratic international
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which promotes individual human flourishing, recognizes the need for
all individuals within the community to flourish and to enjoy rights
that promote their human dignity. 252 The human rights approach,
therefore, can be distinguished from the natural rights IP discourse,
which is preoccupied with the interests of the creator but does not
adequately acknowledge other rights. Human rights framing moves
natural rights theories towards greater accountability for the public
interest.
B. Natural Rights and the Public Interest
The property-centric model that is put forth by proponents of
natural rights to IP emphasizes the property interests of the
creator. 253 This is due to the tendency of natural rights IP theorists to
analyze IP from the perspective of the individual property interest. 254
What is created by the individual remains the property of the
individual and does not become part of the "common stock." 255 The
reward for individual effort, and any corresponding distributional
inequities, may also be justified under this analysis. 256 This concept of
individualism and autonomy is paramount for some natural rights

organizations, particularly those like the WTO, which rely heavily on technical expertise as an
important source of their legitimacy, tend to structure their activity so that questions of
distributive justice appear irrelevant to their tasks.").

252.
See Gregory S. Alexander, IntergenerationalCommunities, 8 LAw & ETHICS HUM.
RTS. 21, 25 (2014) ("My account of human flourishing stresses two necessary conditions. First,
following Amartya Sen, I argue that human beings must develop certain capabilities necessary
for a well lived and distinctly human life. Among these necessary capabilities are health, the
ability to engage in practical reasoning, freedom to make deliberate choices, and the ability to get
along with other people (sociability). . . . Flourishing occurs only in society with, indeed,
dependent upon, other human beings." (emphasis omitted) (footnotes omitted)). Martha
Nussbaum proclaims that individuals should not be content with mere "formal" equality. See
Martha C. Nussbaum, Capabilities and Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 273, 292 (1997).
Everyone should seek to eliminate unfavorable economic and social situations for the benefit of
society. Id.
253.
See MERGES, supra note 11, at 31; Mossoff, supra note 11, at 953; Yen, supra note 18,
at 520-21.
See Craig, supra note 198, at 43.
254.
255.
See Hughes, supra note 21, at 299 ("[Richard Epstein] suggests that granting people
property rights in goods procured through their labor 'increase [s] the common stock of mankind,'
a utilitarian argument grounded in increasing mankind's collective wealth. This justification is
called into question by an obvious problem. If the new wealth remains the private property of the
laborer, it does not increase the common stock. If it can be wantonly appropriated by the social
mob, the laborer will realize quickly that he has no motivation to produce property and increase
the common stock." (footnotes omitted)).
256.
See MERGES, supra note 11, at 106 ("[T]he capacity to work hard and be creative is
something that a person just naturally possesses, and that the actual hard work, and its fruits,
thus belong rightfully to that person.").
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scholars. 257
Merges, for instance, relies on Locke and Kant for
theoretical rationales that focus on the individual first, with the
community having a secondary interest. 258
Kantian philosophy has also been utilized to advance a theory
of a "community of owners,"259 in which each person has a duty to
respect the property of the other. 260 Yet even Kant's philosophies, as
applied to IP, acknowledge the importance of the community and the
inherent dignity and value of each human being. 2 6 1 This reference to
human dignity reflects the language used in human rights discourse
Still, an analysis from the
and international instruments. 262
perspective of a "community of owners" gives greater priority to the
individual property interest. Significantly, the individual in question
could be a legal entity rather than a human being. For example, large
corporations seeking higher global IP standards could benefit from
expansive IP protection based on this type of framing. 263
As Carys Craig observes,
[o]ne might, of course, distinguish between a concern for the copyright holder's
property rights and a more powerful understanding of those rights as the author's
moral and natural entitlement. . . . [But] [tihe easy slippage from "property" to
"proprietary" quickly turns an economically rationalized interest into a morally
264
deserved right.

A human rights framework moves the analysis from one dominated by
the property interest to one which considers the rights of various
This is an important distinction
individuals in the community.
between a human rights approach and the natural rights property
model. 265

VI. HUMAN RIGHTS

APPROACHES VALUE THE COMMUNITY OF

INDIVIDUALS

As this Article has discussed, the predicted moderating effect of
a human rights approach to IP is at odds with the predominant

Id. at 17-18.
257.
Id. at 19 (arguing that society has an interest but not a co-equal right).
258.
Id. at 88.
259.
Id.
260.
Id. at 87.
261.
See, e.g., UDHR, supra note 19, pmbl., art. 1.
262.
Merges contends that Lockean and Kantian natural right philosophies continue to be
263.
pertinent when large corporations are the IP owner. MERGES, supranote 11, at 22.
Craig, supra note 198, at 15.
264.
This Article refers to the natural rights property model and not to natural rights
265.
generally. It does so because the IP scholarship on natural rights that is being discussed here is
about the right to the fruits of one's labor, and not about broader natural rights.
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natural rights property-centric analysis, which has the potential to
bolster claims for more entrenched and expansive IP rights. This is
one reason why the notion of a human right to IP, although appealing
to some social justice advocates, raises concerns for other
commentators. 2 6 6
Yet a human rights approach can be distinguished from a
Lockean property-based analysis of IP. The UDHR recognizes the
inherent dignity of the human being, acknowledges all human rights
as equal and inalienable, and aims to promote justice and social
progress. 267 Starting from this point, human rights frameworks for IP
diverge from property-focused natural rights theories of IP. According
to human rights theory, all rights are indivisible, interdependent, and
interrelated. 2 6 8
They must, therefore, be balanced against one
another. 269
This is one way the international human rights IP discourse
can lend support to natural rights arguments for tempering IP
rights. 270 Much like the proponents of a human rights framework for
IP law, some advocates of natural rights rationales for IP suggest that
271
the natural rights lens will benefit creators and the public alike.
For example, Shiffrin criticizes standard interpretations of Lockean

266.
See, e.g., Gana, supra note 92, at 318 ("[The human rights regime] should not provide
a source of legitimacy for the newly established minimum standards of international intellectual
property protection under the TRIPS Agreement. If anything, the individualistic orientation of
human rights ideology . . . should raise questions about the universal validity of contemporary
forms of intellectual property protection reflected in the TRIPS and its predecessor
agreements.").
See UDHR, supra note 19, pmbl. ("Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of
267.
the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of
freedom, justice and peace in the world[.] . . . Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights
have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent
of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear
and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people[.] . . . Whereas the
peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human
rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women
and have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger
freedom[.]").
Hannu Wager & Jayashree Watal, Human Rights and InternationalIntellectual
268.
Property Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 149,

158 (Christophe Geiger ed., 2015).
269.
Id.
These are some of the arguments presented by scholars like Wendy Gordon and
270.
Alfred Yen. Gordon, for instance, suggests that natural rights will lead to a balanced IP, and Yen
advocates natural rights as preferable to utilitarian theories as a way to limit IP rights. See
discussion supra Part IV.C.
271.
Gordon, supra note 14, at 1538 ("Natural-rights theory can yield significant
protection for free speech interests. . . . The Article shows why when the public's claims conflict
with a laborer's, the public's claims should prevail.").
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labor theory for failing to sufficiently account for the importance of
initial common ownership. 272
Various scholars point out that a creator does not labor alone
but rather relies on the society of which she is part to build on the
works of others. 273 This makes the laborer's claim incomplete.2 74 This
type of analysis aligns with the human rights approach to IP insofar
as equality of all persons is central to the analysis. 275 It also
acknowledges the tension between the natural rights of the creator
and the rights of the community. 276 A human rights analysis injects a
stronger consideration of community interests than currently exists in
much of the natural rights IP literature.
A human rights approach to IP creates a framework that
emphasizes more than the individual property interest.
The
advantage of human rights framing over property-centric natural
rights analyses of IP is that the former supports a vision of IP rights
that protects the individual creator but equally values the interests of
the community of users. More specifically, the community has rights
and interests that may diverge from those of the creator or owner of

the IP.
A. Beyond the Property Interest
The natural right to property provides a basis for natural
rights claims to IP. Though controversial, property is recognized in
the UDHR as a human right. 277 However, neither the ICCPR nor the

272.
Shiffrin, supra note 182, at 149 ("I think that the standard account is called into
question because it is unable to acknowledge the primacy of the thesis of common ownership and
to explain how Locke understands the compatibility of private appropriation with this notion.").
The author further states: "Locke notes that 'labour put a distinction between [acorns collected
by a person] and the common."' Id. at 147 (emphasis omitted).
273.
See, e.g., Craig, supra note 198, at 36 ("The interdependent nature of human culture
means that intellectual works are necessarily the products of collective labour and so ought to be
owned collectively."); Hettinger, supra note 176, at 38 ("If laboring gives the laborer the right to
receive the market value of the resulting product, this market value should be shared by all
those whose ideas contributed to the origin of the product. The fact that most of these
contributors are no longer present to receive their fair share is not a reason to give the entire
market value to the last contributor."); Yen, supra note 18, at 554-55.
274.
See Yen, supra note 18, at 554-55.
275.
Shiffrin, supra note 182, at 167 ("Common ownership, for Locke, is not, I think, best
seen as a mere starting place or an easily overturned default rule. It is also a concrete expression
of the equal standing of, and the community relationship between, all people.").
Id.
276.
277.
Article 17(1) of the UDHR states: "Everyone has the right to own property alone as
well as in association with others." UDHR, supra note 19, art. 17. Article 17(2), meanwhile,
provides that no one "shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property." Id.; see Helfer, supra note 10,
at 978; Yu, supra note 83, at 92-94.
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ICESCR recognizes a human right to property. 278 Property is not
universally accepted as a human right. Indeed, it has been suggested
that characterizing property as a human right is disingenuous because
it facilitates claims that "legitimize . . . massive inequality." 2 79
IP scholars, focusing on Locke's labor theory, have analyzed
copyright and patent rights within a property model. 2 80 A human
rights analysis along the same lines as the IP natural rights discourse
could further entrench IP interests. Additionally, one could equate
the right to the moral and material interests to one's creative work
with copyright protection so as to claim a natural right to more
extensive protection. In that case, human rights would not have a
moderating effect. Such an analysis presents at least two areas of
concern.
First, from a natural rights perspective, when the issue is
framed as an entitlement to the fruits of one's labor, the property right
becomes the salient aspect of the analysis. This inevitably leads to a
conversation about expanding the property right to the maximum
extent that one can do so without harming others. 281 It then requires
that access be justified as an exception to a natural entitlement that
Second, human rights framing does not
the creator enjoys. 28 2
necessarily exclude corporations, who have been the main demandeurs
IP
standards
and
of increased
global
and
beneficiaries
2 83
human
To the contrary, corporations have utilized
harmonization.
rights law to protect their IP interests. 284
Nonetheless, a human rights approach, depending on how it is
framed and applied, could be used to restrict IP owners, particularly
large corporations, from enforcing IP claims that impinge on
important human interests, such as the right to food or the right to
health. More specifically, if the human rights relating to IP protection

278.
See generally ICESCR, supra note 93; ICCPR, supra note 127.
279.
WALDRON, supra note 107, at 5 ("[T]here is no right-based argument to be found
which provides an adequate justification for a society in which some people have lots of property
and many have next to none. The slogan that property is a human right can be deployed only
disingenuously to legitimize the massive inequality that we find in modern capitalist
countries.").

280.
See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 14, at 1581; Robert P. Merges, Locke for the Masses:
Property Rights and the Products of Collective Creativity, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1179, 1191 (2008);
Adam Mossoff, Locke's Labor Lost, 9 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 155, 156 (2002).
Gordon, supra note 14, at 1539.
281.
282.
See MERGES, supra note 11, at 273 ("[That property does not confer the right to deny
relief to those in 'pressing want'; and . . . [those] in desperate need have an actual, binding right
to the assets held by legitimate owners, and this right arises from the same source, and carries
the same weight, as an initial appropriator's right.").
283.
OseiTutu, supra note 76, at 38.
284.
See Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, 2007-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 41, 57, 63 (2007).
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are defined as rights belonging exclusively to human persons,
corporations could be excluded from any natural entitlement to IP.
Corporations may own IP, but they are not human creators or
innovators. 285 As discussed, however, corporations can protect their
property interests through human rights law-at least in Europe.
Nonetheless, from a human rights perspective, IP, even if it is owned
by corporations, should promote human flourishing. 286
Moreover, while natural rights theories of property can have
the effect of prioritizing the interests of the property holder, natural
rights are not incompatible with distributive justice. 287 John Finnis
suggests that, under a natural rights framework, justice requires
redistribution when there are large wealth disparities. 288 This is
because, in such instances, "the rich have failed to redistribute that
portion of their wealth which could be better used by others for the
28 9
realization of basic values in their own lives."
Even under a property-focused model, property owners may
have some social obligation that limits what they can do with their
property. This is based on the idea that property rights should entail
some social responsibility. 290 Gregory Alexander advances a social
function theory of property in US property law that promotes human
flourishing. 291 Alexander contends that even if the social obligation is
285.
Other theories of property may also support limits on corporate claims. Margaret
Radin, for instance, advances a personhood theory of property, which is based on Hegel's
philosophy. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 977 (1982).
She suggests that some types of property are more closely linked to the person than others. Id. at
993.
This should not be limited to economic arguments about employment generated by
286.
companies that own IP.
287.
FINNIS, supra note 139, at 169 ("The good of personal autonomy in community, as we
have just traced it in outline, suggests that the opportunity of exercising some form of private
ownership, including of means of production, is in most times and places a requirement of
justice. It is a requirement that strongly conditions, but also is conditioned by, the concrete
application of the general principles and criteria of distributive justice." (footnote omitted)).
288.
Id. at 174.
Id. ("For the objective of justice is not equality but the common good, the flourishing
289.
of all members of the community[.]").
290.
M.C. Mirow, The Social-ObligationNorm of Property:Duguit, Hayem and Others, 22
FLA. J. INT'L L. 191, 192 (2010) ("In essence, the idea of the social-obligation norm of property is
that '[p]roperty rights should have their share of social responsibility.' These ideas contrasted
with the dominant conception of property as an absolute right in which the owner is free to do or
not to do whatever the owner likes with the property. Duguit's characterization of private
property limits it by requiring a minimum level of social utility beyond which property no longer
exists.").
Alexander, supra note 223, at 748 ("The normative claim is that the version of the
291.
social-obligation norm that I develop here is morally superior to other candidates for the
social-obligation norm. It is superior because it best promotes human flourishing, i.e., my version
of the social-obligation norm enables individuals to live lives worthy of human dignity. In some
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not explicitly recognized in US property law, courts occasionally
incorporate something that approximates this norm into their decision
making. 292

As Matthew Mirow explains, the social function theory of
property contrasts with the "despotic ownership" that represents the
Blackstonian view of property. 293 Although the social function theory
is not the dominant property model in the United States, a number of
US legal scholars have become advocates for the social obligation
norm to counter absolutist views of property. 294 A natural rights
property-centric analysis of IP seems to align with the Blackstonian
vision of property, whereas a human rights framework for IP, like
Alexander's social function norm for property, promotes human
flourishing.
IP rights have implications for many other areas because these
rights, by definition, create spheres of inclusion and exclusion. In
particular, the legally constructed ability to restrict access to
information and technology can impact various aspects of human
flourishing. International human rights law contemplates multiple
rights, thereby moving the IP natural rights discussion beyond the
As such, this framing enlarges the range of
property interest.
interests that must be considered when analyzing competing claims,
as well as the way these interests must be balanced against one
another.
In other words, human rights framing requires one to
consider the broader community to which one belongs.
B. A Broader Community
One might dispute whether human rights framing is superior
to a natural rights property approach because, arguably, natural
rights property theories also contain natural limits. 29 5
However,
human rights framing can be distinguished from a natural rights
property analysis because it more effectively acknowledges co-equal
claims. If the creator or innovator has a more significant interest than

cases it may also promote social utility, economic efficiency, or similar values; but those values
do not provide its primary normative foundation. Although the social-obligation theory developed
here is not indifferent to efficiency, utilitarian, or similar considerations, its overriding
normative commitment is to human flourishing.").
Id.
292.
293.
Mirow, supra note 290, at 195 ("This new way of looking at property, the
social-function model of property, was introduced in 1910 by the French doctoral student Henri
Hayem, and a few years later, it was widely disseminated by Duguit. As Blackstone represents
'despotic ownership,' so Duguit has come to represent property's 'social function."').
294.
Id. at 194.
295.
See supra Part IV.
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the user, then the user has a higher burden to meet.
The property-centric natural rights analysis focuses on the property
interest of the creator. As a result, the user-the person seeking to
share a digital novel with a friend or seeking to access a patented
medical test, for example-would need to prove that she would suffer
harm if her actions were to be restricted by IP rights. If IP protection
becomes the default position, then access must be justified as an
exception. This has the effect of prioritizing the interests of the
creator or owner of IP.
Mary Ann Glendon cautions that the "current tendency to
frame every social controversy in terms of a clash of rights . . . impedes

compromise, mutual understanding, and the discovery of common
ground." 296 However, as she reminds us, there is no "lone rights
bearer," because each person has rights within the context of a
community to which that person belongs. 297 The natural rights
discourse in US legal literature places significant value on the rights
of an individual creator but gives relatively little weight to the
Yet every person necessarily
community of which she is part.
functions within a wider community, starting at home with the family
and extending through to the neighborhood, locality, region, or nation.
It is not necessarily the goal of human rights to ensure
absolute equality, but rather to promote human flourishing for all the
members of the community. 298 A human rights perspective is
beneficial because it contemplates many rights, of which property is
only one. For example, one may conceive of a community as being
comprised of individual property owners. 299 Yet the most vulnerable
individuals-those whose human rights may be most easily trampled
upon-may not own property. They may not have a home, food, or
other necessities. As a result, they may not be part of the defined
community whose interests matter. In this regard, the community
that a human rights perspective envisions is a broader community,
and one that is more inclusive.
Human rights approaches to IP contemplate the wide array of
rights that human beings enjoy, whereas natural rights IP rationales
are largely based on an analysis that treats property rights as
paramount. 300 Even if the property interest is considered a human
296.

MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE,

ix-xii (1991) (explaining that the penchant to do "'whatever I want with my property'[] promotes
unrealistic expectations and ignores both social costs and rights of the rights of others").
297.
Id. at 47-48, 74.
FINNIS, supranote 139, at 174.
298.
299.
MERGES, supra note 11, at 88.
GLENDON, supra note 296, at 43 ("In the case of property, it was not the Fifth
300.
Amendment, but the Lockean paradigm, cut loose from its context, that became part of our
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right, this does not mean that it must lead to an expansion of property
rights. Human rights are interdependent and indivisible.3 01 The other
human rights of other members of society are therefore as important
as the property right or the material and moral interests of the
creator. These may include, for example, the rights to health, food,
education,
and various
other rights
that promote human
302
flourishing.
The evaluation of competing interests changes when the user
has an equal claim in the form of a human right. From a human
rights perspective, property is no more important than other human
rights. Importantly, there is no hierarchy of human rights-at least
in theory. 303 Hence, the interests of the copyright or patent holder do
not have a greater weight than the interests of other members of
society, even if the competing interests are not property rights.
In practice, commentators have observed that there is a
hierarchy of human rights. 304 For example, under the European
Convention of Human Rights, some rights are prioritized. 305 Some
rights are nonderogable, such as the right to life and the right to be
free from torture and slavery. 306 It has been suggested, therefore, that
rights can be balanced by taking various factors into consideration,
including the seriousness of the interference and the social aim the
rights purport to protect.3 0 7
Even if one were to accept a hierarchy of rights, there is no
clear reason why IP rights should take precedence over the right to
health or the right to culture, for example. Assuming a human right
property story as well as of our rights discourse. Blackstone's flights of fancy about property as
absolute dominion stuck in American legal imaginations[.]").
301.
See, e.g., Wprld Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declarationand Programmeof
Action, T 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (June 25, 1993) ("All human rights are universal,
indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The international community must treat human
rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis.
While the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural
and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their
political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and
fundamental freedoms.").

302.
U.N.

See UDHR, supra note 19, arts. 25-26; see also Human Development Index (HDI),
DEV.

PROGRAMME,

http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi

[https://perma.ccBV59-3HGV] (measuring human development by taking into account aspects of
human flourishing such as health, and education and literacy in addition to economic
well-being).
303.
Ducoulombier, supra note 137, at 39.
304.
Id. at 40-42.
305.
Id. at 42.
306.
Id. at 44 (citing Al-Saadoon v. United Kingdom, 2010-Il Eur. Ct. H.R. 61, 125-26
(2010)).
307.
Id. at 50-51.
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to patent protection exists, it would seem that, in the event of a
conflict, the right to food should take precedence over a multinational
corporation's patent rights in genetically modified seeds. 308 In fact, if
one were to create a hierarchy of rights, it would be by no means clear
that property, which is not universally accepted as a human right and
does not appear in either the ICESCR or the ICCPR, should be at the
top of the list.
Furthermore, human rights may entail positive duties in
addition to the obligation to refrain from causing harm. 309 Article
29(1) of the UDHR articulates this concept of duty to the community:
"Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and
full development of his personality is possible." 310 Article 29(2)
addresses the need for limitations on the rights of each individual in
order to respect the rights and freedoms of others and to meet the
"just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in
a democratic society."3 11 The ICESCR preamble states: "Realizing
that the individual, having duties to other individuals and to the
community to which he belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for
the promotion and observance of the rights recognized in the present
Covenant[.]" 3 12
The preamble to the ICCPR contains identical
language. 3 13
This duty to the community is distinct from the arguments
presented by some natural rights scholars that one has a duty to
refrain from causing harm. 314 Wendy Gordon argues, for example,
that the public has an entitlement to the commons and that the

308.

Thanks to participants of the Chicago-Kent/Loyola IP Colloquium for a thoughtful

discussion on this question.

309.
states:

GLENDON, supra note 296, at 13; see also UDHR, supra note 19, art. 29. Article 29

(1) Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full
development of his personality is possible. (2) In the exercise of his rights and
freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law
solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and

freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and
the general welfare in a democratic society.
Id. art. 29(1)-(2).
Id. art. 29(1).
310.
See id. art 29(2).
311.
ICESCR, supranote 93, pmbl (emphasis omitted).
312.
See ICCPR, supra note 127, pmbl. ("Realizing that the individual, having duties to
313.
other individuals and to the community to which he belongs, is under a responsibility to strive
for the promotion and observance of the rights recognized in the present Covenant[.]").
Gordon, supranote 14, at 1538.
314.
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creator cannot rely on labor theory to harm the public. 315 However,
the limitation on harming others is a lesser obligation than the
community-oriented language adopted in these human rights
instruments.
Admittedly, human rights are highly individualistic in many
respects. For example, the civil and political rights primarily protect
individual freedoms. These include, among others, the right to life
and the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of one's life; 3 1 6 the right to
be free from torture, slavery and servitude; 317 and the right to freedom
of expression. 318 The economic, social, and cultural rights, however,
reflect a greater recognition of some duty to the community. These
rights are not limited to negative liberties, but include, for example,
the right to food and the right to participate in cultural life. 3 1 9 Such
rights are to be realized progressively. Ultimately, both the civil and
political rights and the economic, social, and cultural rights entail
respect for a wide array of rights which are properly enjoyed and
circumscribed in relation to the rights of other individuals.
From an international law perspective, the obligation to
respect human rights is an obligation on the state. 320 Nonetheless,
human rights effectively regulate human conduct within the context of
the community because, in carrying out its obligation to ensure that
these rights are respected, the state will regulate the behavior of its
citizens. For example, the state will intervene to isolate and punish

315.
Id. at 1544, 1550-51 ("But by our own actions we cannot give ourselves a right to
impair others' fundamental human entitlements."). The harm that Gordon identifies is excluding
the public from using an intellectual product that has impacted the culture. Id. at 1553-54, 1567
("That an intellectual product is new, would not have otherwise existed, and may initially bring
benefit to the public, does not guarantee that later exclusions from it will be harmless. Tort law
has long recognized that once action has begun, inaction can result in harm, not merely in the

failure to confer a benefit. Analogously, once a creator exposes her intellectual product to the
public, and that product influences the stream of culture and events, excluding the public from
access to it can harm." (footnotes omitted)). Thus, the public could make a reliance argument
regarding IP-protected goods. See id. at 1567-68 ("[E]ven if A's appropriation leaves 'as much' for
others, it does not leave 'enough, and as good.' Mere quantitative identity is not enough. This is
essentially a reliance argument: having changed people's position, the inventor cannot then
refuse them the tools they need for surviving under their new condition.").
316.
ICCPR, supra note 127, art. 6(1); see also Gordon, supra note 14, at 1561 ("But the
same no-harm principle dictates that the laborer should not do harm to other peoples' claim to
the common. When the two conflict, the common must prevail. Were the result otherwise, the
natural law would grant laborers a claim right to do harm, reversing Locke's first law of nature
that no harm be done.").
317.
ICCPR, supra note 127, arts. 7-8.
318.
Id. art. 19.
319.
See ICESCR, supra note 93, arts. 11, 15(1).
320.
ALSTON & GOODMAN, supra note 140, at 1047. Accordingly, these are not rights
created by the state, but rights that must be respected by the state.
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those who deliberately cause physical harm or death to others. 21
Ultimately, therefore, human rights require one to consider the rights
of other human beings in the exercise of one's own rights. 32 2
VII. CONCLUSION

Theoretical justifications for IP can affect the way the public,
creators, and courts interpret and understand IP rights. 323 If society
recognizes copyright as private property akin to physical property,
such as a car, a home, or a book, then it becomes easier to view
reproduction without consent of the copyright holder as theft.
Similarly, if IP rights are treated as human rights or natural
entitlements, there is potential to view these rights as more expansive
and to view the state's ability to restrict these rights as relatively
limited.
It is no surprise, therefore, that many proponents of natural
rights to IP tend to support broader, and possibly more entrenched, IP
protections. Yet human rights advocates suggest that human rights
framing can have a moderating influence on IP law. The natural
rights property analyses of IP and human rights have a common basis
in the philosophies of John Locke and other natural rights
philosophers. Thus, both human rights and natural rights property
approaches to IP are derived from natural rights philosophies but
seemingly lead to contradictory conclusions.
In exploring this apparent conflict, this Article identifies two
ways that the human rights framework differs from and enriches the
natural rights property-centric analysis of IP. First, the human rights
narrative offers a broader framing than the natural rights IP model.
Proponents of natural rights to IP focus on the individual property
interest, thereby putting property rights at the center while relegating
other rights to the periphery. This has the effect of elevating property
above all other rights. The human rights approach, by comparison,
provides a more complete perspective because it requires one to
contemplate various interdependent rights.
The second, and related, way that human rights framing
contributes to the natural rights discourse is by acknowledging the
existence of equally valid competing claims. This does not mean that
321.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 782.04 (2017) (punishing conduct that results in the unlawful
killing of another person).
322.
GLENDON, supra note 134, at 177-79.
323.
See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 205-06 (2003) (upholding the Copyright Term
Extension Act as a congressional decision that would "provide greater incentive for ... authors to
create and disseminate their work in the United States"); Mandel, supra note 149, at 275-76
(discussing how the way in which IP rights are framed can impact public perception).
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the natural rights approach is more individualistic and the human
rights perspective more communitarian. Indeed, human rights have
historically been individualistic in many respects.
However,
international human rights framing enhances the conversation
because it underscores the value of multiple human interests rather
than giving preference to the property interest. Importantly, because
the various human rights are interdependent and indivisible, they do
not need to be assessed and defended in reference to their interference
with individual property rights. Instead, all rights are weighed
against one another without prioritizing the property right.
Human rights framing reinforces the idea that balance should
be inherent in natural rights approaches to IP. This is because a
human rights lens for IP injects a dignitary aspect that can assist in
defining the scope of the rights that each person enjoys.

324

A human

rights approach is beneficial insofar as it simultaneously promotes the
individual interest and the interests of the community.
The natural rights property focus defines competing interests
in relation to the individual property right and then carves out limits
and exceptions in respect of that property interest. A human rights
lens, by contrast, promotes human flourishing for the individual
creator, as well as human flourishing for the community of individuals
who use and enjoy the creator's contribution.

See ICESCR, supra note 93, pmbl. ("Considering that, in accordance with the
324.
principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity
and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of
freedom, justice and peace in the world, [and] [r]ecognizing that these rights derive from the
inherent dignity of the human person[]"); UDHR, supra note 19, pmbl. ("Whereas recognition of
the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family
is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world[.]").

